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FEDERAL ANTIBIAS LEGISLATION AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: SOME PROBLEMS WITH
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
by
Howard 0. Hunter*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, changes and developments in various policies
of the American government have given rise to a vast array of com-
plex regulations applicable to institutions of higher learning that
receive federal financial support.' Before World War II the federal
government was not wholly divorced from matters of higher educa-
tion, but financial support came principally from state or local gov-
ernments and from private sources. 2 The shift to a more active fed-
eral role has profoundly affected the nation's private colleges and
universities.' While state schools have always had a close relation-
ship with their supporting governments, the increased federal role
has seriously endangered the institutional autonomy of private uni-
versities. As one scholar has noted, "The American university has
traverse[d], in recent decades, a considerable part of the road from
an autonomous financially independent model to an essentially
publicly supported, interdependent institution."'
* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University; Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the following people: Dean
L. Ray Patterson and Professors Henry Miller, Herman Orentlicher and Charles Shanor for
their helpful suggestions in preparing this article; Messrs. Henry L. Bowden and Gerald F.
Handley, with whom the author has worked in connection with certain federal investigations
of bias charges; Joseph Gerberg, Jane L. Phillips, Constance Y. Singleton, Jeffrey B. Stewart,
and Carol A. Walker for their excellent research and papers; and William F. Rucker and John
C. Harrison for their work as his research assistants.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-99.67 (1977).
2 The history of federal support to higher education and of its interrelationship with
private and local government support is documented in a number of sources. See, e.g., A.
DUPREE, SCIENCE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A HISTORY OF POLICIES AND ACTIVITIS TO 1940
(1957); H. ORLANS, THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON HIGHER EDUCATION (1962); B. SMITH
& J. KARLESKY, THE UNIVERSITIES IN THE NATION's RESEARCH EFFORT (1977); THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION (D. Knight ed. 1960). The scope of current federal in-
volvement is made particularly clear by reference to the list of programs to which antibias
regulations attach. See 45 C.F.R. § 80 app. A (1977).
* See generally B. SMITH & J. KARLESKY, supra note 2; M. Todorovich, The University
and the State: A Report on the Current Interrelationship in the United States (Aug. 31, 1977)
(unpublished paper presented at Second International Conference of the International Coun-
cil on the Future of the University, Toronto, Canada, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1977). Mr. Todorovich
is the Executive Secretary of University Centers for Rational Alternatives, Inc.
I M. Todorovich, supra note 3, at 22.
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Any gift earmarked for a particular use limits the freedom of
choice of the recipient. Diminished institutional autonomy in the
last three decades, however, has resulted primarily from govern-
ment grants conditioned upon requirements unrelated to the use of
the funds.5 Executive orders have imposed antibias restrictions on
government contractors for some time,6 but statutes have now ex-
panded the scope of such orders and have added a legislative impri-
matur to the executive action The antibias policies implemented
by these orders and statutes may be laudable; they may also have
little or nothing to do with the particular purpose of a government
contract or grant.8 Present governmental practices reflect the propo-
sition that
Government grants to institutions are essentially contracts. They may be cast in the
form of gifts, but the government pays money in return for the institution's agreement to
provide certain services. Although society, rather than the government, may benefit from
such payments, there is definitely a quid pro quo. For a discussion of the long-term effects of
government grants made for specific purposes, see B. SMITH & J. KARLEsKY, supra note 2. For
a consideration of the problems inherent in result-oriented awards for the advancement of
utilitarian concerns, see Brooks, The Federal Government and the Autonomy of Scholarship,
in CONTROVERSIES AND DECISIONS: THE SOCIAL SCIENCzS AND PUBLIC POLICY 235 (C. Frankel ed.
1976).
6 The use of the government's contracting power as a means for enforcing antibias poli-
cies dates from World War II when President Roosevelt established the Fair Employment
Practice Committee. Exec. Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 8,823, 3 C.F.R. 968 (1938-1943 Compilation) and Exec. Order
No. 9,346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation). The Committee was continued by Presi-
dent Truman, see Exec. Order No. 9,664, 3 C.F.R. 480 (1943-1948 Compilation), but President
Eisenhower created a new committee. See Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953
Compilation). President Kennedy's orders substantially broadened the scope of governmental
involvement in seeking to assure equal employment opportunities. See Exec. Order No.
10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3
C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963 Compilation). President Johnson continued the policies of his prede-
cessors, see Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), and he also issued
an order which sought to eliminate sexual bias among government contractors. See Exec.
Order No.11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation). President Nixon modified the ap-
proach, but generally continued these policies. See Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803
(1966-1970 Compilation). President Ford helped carry out the congressional mandate of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), see note 16 infra, by directing that
regulations be promulgated to prevent discrimination against the handicapped. See Exec.
Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794 note (1976). For a brief
history of these Executive Orders, legislation in the area, and a plan for the reorganization
of the government's handling of such matters, see President Carter's Reorg. Plan No. I of
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978).
See notes 14-22 infra and accompanying text.
For example, a research project in subatomic physics may have little to do with race
relations, but a university receiving federal support for such a project must abide by federal
antibias statutes and regulations. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (sex); 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1976) (handicap); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (race). The imposition of such requirements on
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if the American government pays for certain goods and serv-
ices, the government also has the right to impose upon the
contractor demands which may not have anything to do with
what is being procured by the government, i.e., it may impose
on the contractor obligations of a most general nature.?
This article assumes that collateral terms attached to a govern-
mental grant are proper exercises of sovereignty and that the gov-
ernment may legitimately seek to eradicate discrimination based on
sex, race, or physical handicap in both the private and public sec-
tors. Arguments to the contrary, although not without merit, are
beyond the scope of this discussion. The concern here is with the
procedures for enforcement rather than with the substance of the
underlying statutes. Procedural regulations may have greater im-
pact than the substantive statutes on institutional autonomy and
the freedom of individual teachers and students.
The university that wishes to maintain institutional autonomy
and continue to receive government support is faced with a funda-
mental problem. It must determine what regulations and what en-
forcement mechanisms may be tolerated consistent with academic
freedom and the pursuit of education and research. 0 The govern-
grant recipients has'caused concern. See, e.g., Kidd, The Implications of Research Funds for
Academic Freedom, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 613, 616-17 (1963); Kirk, Massive Subsidies
and Academic Freedom, 28 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB. 607, 611-12 (1963). Kirk expressed general
disapproval of assistance because it led inevitably to four problems: (1) pressure to conform
to the benefactor's ideology; (2) an emphasis on utilitarian, rather than purely humanistic
or scientific results; (3) grant administration that is bureaucratic in the worst sense; and (4)
the development by government agencies of a power over university activities that is more
difficult to resist than other threats to academic freedom. Id. See also E. Shils, The Govern-
mental Impact on the Universities: Academic Appointments (Aug. 30, 1977) (unpublished
paper presented at Second International Conference of the International Council on the
Future of the University, Toronto, Canada, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1977).
M. Todorovich, supra note 3, at 3.
10 For a definition of the term academic freedom, see notes 28-38 infra and accompanying
text. The main focus of this article is on private universities, but federal regulations also
impose significant limitations on the freedom of activity of state colleges and universities.
Dr. Fred C. Davison, President of the University of Georgia, has vividly expressed concerns
almost identical to those of administrators at private universities.
At the University of Georgia, we have had to create entire new offices staffed by
people taken from other essential duties, such as teaching and helping students.
To keep track of the mounds of paperwork, we have had to invent whole new
systems for receiving, completing, monitoring, filing and cataloging. We have been
forced to compose, print and distribute volumes of letters, booklets, brochures,
reports, notices and assorted other materials. We have become so bogged down in
trying to cope with the morass of paperwork that we sometimes feel we're losing
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ment has demonstrated that it has the power to modify some of the
policies or activities of aid recipients," but it should not have the
power to impose limitations that unreasonably infringe upon indi-
vidual and institutional rights. Federal antibias legislation and the
regulations enforcing it have set the stage for resolution of some of
the questions concerning the limits of governmental intrusions. Pri-
vate universities cannot realistically refuse governmental assis-
tance. Costs are too high and endowments are too small to-pay the
salaries and support the research necessary to sustain the vitality
of major centers of learning. Former Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, David Mathews, has clearly identified the source of
the problem:
sight of what we're really supposed to be doing-teaching and inquiring into the
nature of things.
Davison, The Federal Threat to Higher Education, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Jan.
22, 1978 (Magazine), at 24, 26. Nevertheless, state supported schools already have a close
relationship with at least one government which gives them a status essentially different from
that of private universities. This status may, in fact, provide a better basis for the protection
of individual rights than do federal regulations imposed upon recipients. Since public univer-
sities are an arm of the state, they are prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment from in-
fringing civil rights in areas where private schools might not be bound.
It is also interesting to note the different contexts in which concerns about threats to the
freedom of universities and teachers have arisen. One of the major efforts of the American
Association of University Professors, for instance, has been to protect faculty members from
internal and external pressures through tenure. See, e.g., C. BYSE & L. JOUGHIN, TENURE IN
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1959); ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (L. Joughin ed. 1967);
Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J.L. & Enuc. 279 (1977).
During the first 20 years after World War II, the South continuously faced problems with
attempts to prevent the racial integration of colleges and universities. See generally Staff of
Arthur Garfield Hays Memorial Fund, Racial Integration and Academic Freedom (pts. 1 &
2), 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 725, 899 (1959). Loyalty oaths and attempts to weed communists from
the campuses presented problems during the 1950s. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 364
U.S. 234 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). See generally
Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963); Orent-
licher, Repealing the Disclaimer Affidavit, 46 AM. A.U. PROFESSORS BULL. 55 (1960); van den
Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 515 (1963); notes
50-90 infra and accompanying text. Protest demonstrations at colleges in the 1960s and early
1970s often developed internally although they may have been sparked or exacerbated by
external events. See generally C. FRANKEL, EDUCATION AND THE BARRICADES (1968); S. HOOK,
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC ANARCHY (1969); Committee on Freedom of Expression at
Yale, Report, reprinted in 4 HUMAN RIGHTS BULL. 357 (1975). Campus disruptions resulted in
some attempts at government intervention by way of threats to cut off funds to schools which
failed to keep their students under control. See, e.g., Corporation of Haverford College v.
Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See generally Comment, Aid to Education,
Student Unrest, and Cutoff Legislation: An Overview, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1971).
" See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
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American educators are now concerned about over control,
over regulation, over bureaucratization and a multitude of
what they consider to be improper intrusions. It is important:
to note that these intrusions are not the crass invasions of
political leaders seeking to use universities for partisan pur-
poses but rather managerial dictates from representatives of
the public whose primary interest seems to be not in advancing
but in controlling education, much as if it were a public util-
ity.' 2
This paper does not consider the entire spectrum of the university-
state relationship; rather, it focuses on complaints of students about
discriminatory treatment. Such complaints raise problems central
to the general questions of institutional autonomy and academic
freedom.
After a brief survey, in Section II, of the principal antibias stat-
utes at issue here and their implementing regulations, Section III
deals with the general issue of academic freedom and the impact of
federal antibias regulations on that freedom. Section IV focuses on
the acute and sometimes ironic dilemmas posed by conflicts be-
tween a federal antibias investigation, and the policies of the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, more commonly known
as the Buckley Amendment.'3
II. NONDISCRIMINATION STATUTES AND THE APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
The three federal statutes imposing the most direct limitations on
university policies concerning personnel decisions, student admis-
22 D. Mathews, Report to the Second International Conference of the International Coun-
cil on the Future of the University 2 (Sept. 1, 1977) (unpublished paper presented at Second
International Conference of the International Council on the Future of the University, To.
ronto, Canada, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1977) (emphasis in original). The problem of government
intervention can be overstated. The partnership between private universities and the govern-
ment has contributed to significant research and has made higher education available to a
wide cross-section of the populace. At the same time, universities have retained a remark.
able degree of autonomy. As one commentor has observed:
Still, it is arguable that the core activities of the university, teaching and research,
have been largely untouched by the direct hand of public regulation. That is em-
phatically not to say that the substance of the institution's work has been unaf-
fected by government funding decisions and priorities. Clearly it has been, and the
hand of the government has been largely absent from the classroom, the laboratory,
and even the admission committee-despite the enormous sums of federal money
spent on teaching, research and student assistance.
Rosenzweig, An End to Autonomy: Who Pulls the Strings?, CHANOE, Mar., 1978, at 29.
13 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g-1232i (1976).
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sions, and student discipline are Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 4 dealing with race; Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972,' dealing with sex; and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,16 dealing with physical and mental handicaps. These stat-
utes evidence a pervasive federal interest in removing discrimina-
tory policies and practices which have denied opportunities to indi-
viduals on the basis of factors they cannot control.
The ultimate sanction for violating an antibias statute i's loss of
federal funding."7 To ensure compliance and to provide a mecha-
nism for enforcement, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) has promulgated extensive regulations applicable
to all three statutes.' Although voluntary compliance is the stated
goal of the regulatory scheme, 9 an institution must document its
compliance by submitting "timely, complete and accurate reports
at such times, and in such form and containing such information,
as the responsible Department official or his designee may deter-
mine to be necessary to enable him to ascertain whether the recipi-
ent has complied or is complying with this part."' " The government,
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d.2000d-6 (1976).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). As originally enacted this law was inapplicable to university
policies toward students. Section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defined a
"handicapped individual" as one "who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such
individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reason-
ably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services."
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (emphasis added)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976)). This effectively limited the impact upon
educational institutions. An amendment to the Act in 1974 brought educational institutions
within the Act's reach by additionally defining a handicapped person as one "who (A) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities, (B) has a record of such impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an
impairment." Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1619 (1974) (emphasis added) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976)). See generally S. REP.
No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-41, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 6373,
6388-91.
On April 28, 1976, President Ford issued an executive order directing the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to promulgate enforcement and compliance regulations to
be applicable to "any recipient of, or applicant for, federal financial assistance." Exec. Order
No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794 note (1976).
0 See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-80.10, 81.1-81.131 were drafted for use in connection with Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. they have also been adopted for use in connection with sex and
handicap discrimination problems. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.61, 86.71 (1977).
i See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(a) (1977).
45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) (1977) (emphasis added).
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not the institution, decides what information is necessary and when
and how it should be made available. The regulations also provide
that the recipient institution must allow government representa-
tives access "to such of its books, records, accounts, and other
sources of information, and its facilities as may be pertinent to
ascertain compliance with this part. . . .Asserted considerations of
privacy or confidentiality may not operate to bar the Department
from evaluating or seeking to enforce compliance with this Part."12 '
Again, the regulation grants government agents discretion to deter-
mine the time, place, and manner for obtaining access to informa-
tion. In addition, the regulations expressly disallow privacy defenses
to requests for information, although they do provide that such
information shall not be disclosed by government officials "except
where necessary in formal enforcement proceedings or where other-
wise required by law.122
Both the statutes and their implementing regulations contain a
number of procedural safeguards intended to protect institutions
from an arbitrary cut-off of federal financial assistance '.2 A recipi-
ent's assistance cannot be terminated until: (1) the recipient has
been advised of its failure to comply with an antibias provision and
21 Id. § 80.6(c).
12Id. The regulations amplify the bare statutory language. Section 602 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976), does not explicitly require institutions
to maintain specific records, but it does refer to voluntary compliance and a duty of the
appropriate government authorities to make a thorough investigation before imposing sanc-
tions. Such language at least implies that it would be wise for a university to maintain records
with respect to policies and programs for minorities. Section 902 of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), is similar. Section 9 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 708 (1976), specifically requires the maintenance of various records.
2 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 80.8(c) (1977).
Funding terminations are supposed to be limited to the particular program in which the act
of discrimination has taken place. See id. Whether a finding of discrimination in a particular
department of a university would justify a cut-off of funds to the whole university, or just to
the undergraduate college, or just to that department, is an open question. See generally notes
195-200 infra and accompanying text.
A collateral question is whether grants to students-for example, loans under the Na-
tional Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-602 (1976), or veterans' benefits-are equiva-
lent to grants to the student's institution for purposes of federal antibias legislation. At least
one court has answered in the affirmative. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp 597
(D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem. 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975). Bob Jones is consistent with the
Supreme Court's determination that tuition reimbursement grants to parents of parochial
school students violate the First Amendment's establishment of religion clause. See Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973).
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it has been determined that voluntary compliance is not possible;
(2) there has been an express finding of a failure to comply after an
opportunity for hearing; and (3) there has been a full report filed
with the appropriate House and Senate Committees, and thirty
days have passed with no action having been taken."4 While the
ultimate sanction of lost federal assistance is a severe one, a recipi-
ent institution has a number of opportunities to plead its case. Both
Title VI and Title IX have expressly provided for judicial review.2"
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not contain such an express
provision, but judicial review of an administrative decision may be
available pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act."
Although there are procedural safeguards to prevent an arbitrary
and sudden termination of funding, the more immediate problem
may lie at the level of the initial investigation itself. Requests by
federal enforcement agents for information of a confidential nature
raise fundamental problems of intrusion into the private affairs of
individual ,students, administrators, and faculty members, and
could improperly affect the important and often delicate student-
teacher relationship. Moreover, such requests may run directly
counter to the policies enunciated by the Buckley Amendment."
21 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 80.9(c) (1977).
2 See 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976) (Title IX); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) (Title VI).
See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g-1232i (1976). Similar problems may also arise from private litiga-
tion involving allegations of discrimination. Suits against educational institutions have been
brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
(§ 1981); Papish v. Board of Curators, 331 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (§ 1983), aff'd,
464 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). In Runyon § 1981 provided a cause
of action for black students who were denied admission to private, nonsectarian elementary
schools. Whether it could be used as a basis for challenging the admissions policies of a
private institution of higher education is unclear. In Popish the Supreme Court held that a
student expelled from the University of Missouri for publishing an allegedly obscene newspa-
per could maintain an action under § 1983 for an impermissible restraint on free speech. 410
U.S. at 674. For further discussion of Popish, see Note, The First Amendment, Due Process
and the University, 42 U. Mo.-KAN. CiTy L. REv. 390 (1974). Because § 1983 requires state
action it has not been used with much success against private colleges and universities. For
cases involving the state action requirement in the university context, see Grafton v. Brooklyn
Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971);
Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593
(10th Cir. 1969); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees,
385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Powe v. Miles, 294 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd as modified, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968);
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONCERNS
A. Academic Freedom-The Concept
The term "academic freedom" encompasses a group of interests
important to teachers, scholars, students, and administrators from
elementary to graduate and professional schools. 8 The interests all
relate, to a greater or lesser degree, to the transmission of knowledge
and the nourishment of creative thought. The modem concept of
academic freedom in the university context derives principally from
the nineteenth century German ideal of the academy.29 Lehrfreiheit,
the freedom to teach, and Lernfreiheit, the freedom to learn, were
the twin principles of the German ideal." A professor was allowed
to structure his own scholarly research and teaching without inter-
Universities are also subject to the normal contract and tort suits that might be brought
against any institution. Some disgruntled students have sued for breach of contract for their
school's alleged failure to live up to its educational responsibilities. Such suits have not met
with much success on the merits, but there has been judicial recognition of a contract, the
basic terms of which are contained in the school's bulletin. See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall,
529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975);
Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ga. 1977). See generally Note, Contract Law
and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253 (1973). One commentator has even
suggested that a student has a property interest in his status; that such a status is inherently
worthwhile in the prevailing social ethic; and therefore, that a student is entitled to constitu-
tional due process even in the absence of state action. See Note, Common Law Rights for
Private University Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120 (1974). The
issue was briefly raised but not considered in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82
(1978). The Supreme Court, however, has held that education is not a fundamental right
entitled to First Amendment protection. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
m There have been many scholarly considerations of academic freedom as it has been
understood in this country. See, e.g., H. BEALE, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1941); H. BEALE, ARE AMERICAN TEACHERS FREE? (1936); C. BYSE & L.
JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES, AND THE LAW (1959); R.
HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
(1955); R. HUTCHINS, THE UNIVERSITY OF UTOPIA (1953); R. KIRK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM (1955);
R. LESTER, ANTIBiAS REGULATION OF UNIVERSITIES (1974); J. NELSON & G. ROBERTS, THE CEN-
SoRs AND THE SCHOOLS (1963); F. OPPENHEIM, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM (1961); ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM AND TENURE L. (L. Joughin ed. 1969).
2 See Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 431, 435-38 (1963); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom. 81
HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Academic Freedom].
1 This article provides only an outline of the German university ideal. For a more
detailed analysis, see Nisbet, Max Weber and the Roots of Academic Freedom, in
CONTROVERSIES AND DECISIONS 103 (C. Frankel ed. 1976). The seminal work behind the devel-
opment of the nineteenth century ideal of the university in Germany was Wilhelm von
Humboldt's THE SPHERE AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT (London 1854).
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ference from the university or from anyone outside the university.:"
Students chose to attend lectures as they saw fit, and to take their
degree examinations when they felt sufficiently prepared." The
privileges of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit did not extend into so-
ciety at large; the prestige of professors allowed them social privi-
leges unavailable to most Germans." The special position of the
German scholar within his society, however, was viewed as a privi-
lege created specifically in the context of the academy.'3
Although American scholars and educators have looked to the
German ideal as a model to be imitated in part, the American
experience in higher education has been fundamentally different.
Students and professors in the United States have never enjoyed the
special privileges or the autonomy of nineteenth century German
academics. American universities have traditionally had more
structured curricula; students have been limited in their choices of
courses, programs, and institutions; and professors have had to ac-
cept specified teaching responsibilities as a trade-off for the freedom
to pursue individual intellectual interests. The American scholar
has, in part because he has lived in a democratic republic, been
more "of the world." He has tended to view academic freedom as a
concept related not only to his work in the academy, but also to his
role as a citizen.35
' See Academic Freedom, supra note 29, at 1048.
2 See id. at 1049.
3 Imperial Germany was a highly structured and hierarchical society, and the freedom
accorded professors and students in the university was unusual. As one commentator ob-
served:
The virtual unassailability of a German scholar in his chair, once he had been
appointed to the rank of professor, from either local or national pressures gave him
a degree of personal autonomy sufficient to cover just about whatever he wanted it
to cover. Granted the purely academic character of the beginnings of each aspect
of the doctrine of academic freedom and its value in light of early nineteenth-
century firings of faculty members and dismissals of students for political reasons,
the fact is that by Weber's day the double-barreled doctrine of academic freedom
in Germany had become the basis of declared right to teach however a professor
wished, no matter how ideologically, politically, or prophetically, and, on the stu-
dent side, of declared right to engage in whatever activities one wished, no matter
how militant and potentially destructive of academic rectitudes these might be.
Long before Nazi students began to use the idea of Lernfreiheit as a means of
bullying professors beginning in the 1920s, there were student groups in one or other
German university to adopt the same kinds of tactics in behalf of pacifism, social-
ism, and other political doctrines.
Nisbet, supra note 30, at 120-21.
31 See Academic Freedom, supra note 29, at 1048.
" See id. at 1048-51. The American approach to academic freedom has been influenced
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Limitations defining the parameters of teaching within the class-
room, narrowing the scope of research, and restricting the expres-
sion of political, social, or cultural ideas have caused teachers par-
ticular worry. 6 There are substantial reasons for imposing some
limitations on the educational process: teachers are important role
models; society benefits from having citizens who are educated in
the basic skills of language, mathematics, and science; and the
stability of the social and political order depends on the training of
each generation in the means of its operation. With mass public
education from kindergarten to graduate school, public concern
with curricula and with the character of those who are engaged in
the educational process is clearly justified. This concern, however,
may often be difficult to reconcile with individual interests in intel-
lectual autonomy.
In the United States, the concept of academic freedom has its
roots not only in traditional concepts of the university and of teach-
ing, but also in the constitutionally-based system of free expression.
Although it has not always been so, it may now be said that a high
school or college teacher who voices a criticism of government poli-
cies in a political meeting may not be punished by his employer,- for
he has done precisely what the Constitution allows citizens to do.31
by the work of American education theorists, notably John Dewey, who wrote in the early
part of this century:
Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion
for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal. The two
points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent
in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness
and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable sqciety, in
other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free inter-
course and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for par-
ticipation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible
readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of asso-
ciated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education
which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and
the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.
J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 99 (Free Press ed. 1966) (emphasis in original). The
impact of the outside world on the academy continues to be recognized in the legislation
which is the primary focus of this article.
See generally Fuchs, supra note 29; Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Con-
stitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 447 (1963); O'Neil, God and Government at Yale:
The Limits of Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 525 (1975).
: This has been more of a problem for public employees than for teachers at private
institutions. It is now settled, however, that public employment may not be conditioned upon
the surrender of First Amendment rights, see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
234 (1977), although this has not always been true. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
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Indeed, teachers arguably should be encouraged to be activists be-
cause, as role models, they will encourage their students to be active
participants in the processes of democracy. 8
Teaching is nothing more than speaking with a particular pur-
pose, and scholarly writing, regardless of its subject, is generally
within the scope of constitutional protection.39 The essential ele-
ments of academic freedom-speaking, thinking, and writing-are
all constitutionally protected areas of activity. The Supreme Court
has considered a number of cases involving academic freedom is-
sues, but it has not straightforwardly applied the First Amendment
to protect the concept. Three reasons have been important in the
refusal of the Court to put academic freedom clearly within the
protection of the First Amendment. First, many of the cases have
involved elementary or secondary schools, and there is a justifiable
basis for limiting the First Amendment rights, including the right
to receive information, of minors who have not yet developed the
sophistication necessary to deal with conflicting arguments. " Sec-
11 As one author noted: "[Tihe professor is entitled to the same freedom to advocate
ideas and join causes enjoyed by his fellow citizens; indeed, because of his position as intellec-
tual leader, the scholar is especially encouraged to participate in the public forum."
Academic Freedom, supra note 29, at 1048; see Fuchs, supra note 29, at 436. See generally
Murphy, supra note 36; Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAN. L. Rav. 1027
(1969).
Professor Emerson has characterized our entire political system as one based on a model
of the academy. Free speech is valuable because it is the best method for attaining knowledge
and for ensuring the continued vitality of the basic democratic political structure. See T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-8 (Vintage ed. 1967).
11 This is somewhat of an overstatement. Libelous or obscene writing is not constitution.
ally protected, even when presented in the guise of a work of scholarship. See, e.g., Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
1* The Supreme Court's position on this issue is not altogether clear. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that pub-
lic school officials could not prohibit elementary and secondary school students from wearing
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. Id. at 513-14. The majority opinion by Justice
Fortas stated that these students who, for the most part, were minors, were" 'persons' under
our Constitution" and that they were entitled to exercise "fundamental rights" protected by
the Constitution. Id. at 511. Justice Stewart concurred in the result, but he disagreed with
the majority's premise that "the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with
those of adults." Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Black dissented and shared
Justice Stewart's reservation. See id. at 521-22 (Black, J., dissenting). But in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1968), the Court upheld a New York statute which forbade the
distribution of sexually oriented materials to minors, even though the materials were not
considered obscene for adults. See generally Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Pri-
vacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1001 (1975); see also
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality agreed that a ban on the sale
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ond, when a First Amendment question has been squarely presented
to the Court, it has usually been possible to decide the case on
narrow grounds without creating a broad and undefined new area
of separate constitutional interest.' Third, the Court has adopted
a kind of abstention doctrine" with respect to university matters
and has tended to defer to intra-academy methods of resolving
disputes.13 Nevertheless, if the Court has not expressly embraced
the concept of academic freedom as a constitutional right, neither
has the Court wholly rejected it." Although many of the cases have
dealt with problems in elementary or secondary schools, their ra-
tionales are generally applicable to universities.
B. Academic Freedom-The Major Cases
The starting point is Meyer v. Nebraska.5 In the midwestern
United States there were large groups of Scandinavian, East Euro-
pean, and German immigrants who did not speak English or spoke
it haltingly. In order to ensure language homogeneity and to inte-
grate the children of these immigrants into American society,"
Ohio, Nebraska, and Iowa enacted statutes prohibiting the teaching
of any language except English until children reached a certain
grade level. In Nebraska a parochial school teacher named Meyer
was convicted for teaching German to a ten-year-old boy; the Su-
of contraceptives to minors unconstitutionally interfered with right to privacy); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (statute requiring parental consent to minor's
abortion held unconstitutional).
" The federal courts traditionally have followed a policy of avoiding broad constitutional
pronouncements if a narrow and satisfactory alternative is available. This approach was
clearly enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and has been
followed since then. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Ashwan-
der v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83-85 (1978).
12 The federal abstention doctrine is a corollary to the principle discussed in note 41
supra. Federal courts will generally defer to state courts if there is an available state remedy
for the problem presented. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at
85-100.
See notes 95-99 infra and accompanying text.
" See generally text accompanying notes 45-94 infra.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
' At least this was the argument advanced in favor of the statutes. See id. at 397-98.
The statutes in question were 1919 Neb. Laws ch. 249; 1919 Iowa Laws ch. 198; and 1919 Ohio
Laws ch. 249.
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preme Court, however, held the statute to be unconstitutional and
reversed his conviction.47 Justice McReynolds, writing for the Court,
based the reversal on the concept of substantive due process inher-
ent in the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 He considered teaching, in-
cluding the teaching of German, to be a perfectly legitimate occupa-
tion and found the state statutes "without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State to effect."4
During the 1950s the Supreme Court had occasion to consider
several problems arising from various attempts to prevent commu-
nists from invading the educational system. One of the best known
statutory, responses to the perceived menace of communism was
New York's so-called Feinberg Law, 0 which provided that a mem-
ber of an organization which advocated the overthrow of the govern-
ment "by force, violence or any unlawful means""' was ineligible for
employment in a publicly supported school. The constitutionality
of this law was challenged in Adler v. Board of Education,52 a de-
claratory judgment action. The Supreme Court upheld the law,
dismissing First Amendment arguments on the grounds that rea-
sonable limitations could be placed on the constitutional rights of
public employees as a condition of such employment and that the
state was validly concerned with the ideology of teachers.53
A similar statute was struck down in Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
' See 262 U.S. at 399-400. Justice McReynolds' opinion defined the meaning of "liberty"
in the Fourteenth Amendment as follows:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
262 U.S. at 399. See also T. EMERSON, Ta SYSTEM OF FRERDOM OF EXPRESSION 598-600 (1970).
,1 262 U.S. at 400; see id. at 402-03. Justice McReynolds noted that the corollary of
Meyer's right to teach was "the right of parents to engage him. . . to instruct their children."
Id. at 400. The Court's comment concerning parental rights anticipated its decision two years
later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925). In that case the Court
invalidated an Oregon law which effectively outlawed parochial schools because the law
improperly interfered with parents' decisions regarding child rearing. These earlier cases were
decided on the basis of substantive due process; the First Amendment was not at issue
because it had not yet been applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. That was
to come later in a rather offhand manner. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
"' 1949 N.Y. Laws ch. 360 (current version at N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3022 (McKinney 1970)).
s' N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3022(2) (McKinney 1970).
52 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
1 The Court reasoned that
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Although the Court did not accept the concept of academic free-
dom as a constitutional principle, Adler stands as one of the first
significant decisions to consider the impact of the First Amendment
in the context of the academy. The majority did not deny the rele-
vance of the First Amendment as a matter of principle; rather, they
tacitly accepted its applicability and concluded that the Feinberg
Law was a rational limitation on the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms by public servants. 4
Justice Frankfurter dissented for technical and procedural rea-
sons,5 but Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the constitu-
tional issue. " Justice Douglas disagreed on a basic point: in his view
a public employee did not abdicate his constitutional rights upon
entering public service.57
During the same year the Court in Wieman v. Updegraffl8 over-
turned an Oklahoma statute that excluded persons from public
employment by reason of membership in a "communist front or
subversive organization." 9 According to the Court, the New York
statute in Adler required knowing, intentional membership, while
the Oklahoma law punished innocent or unwitting membership. 0
This distinction proved fatal to the Oklahoma law. The Court's
analysis rested on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
[al teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude
of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital
concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities
have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to
their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society,
cannot be doubted.
Id. at 493.
5I Id. at 492-93; cf. id. at 496-97 (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing the act as contrary
to the policy of the First Amendment).
Id. at 497-508 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter believed that the par-
ties lacked standing and that the case was not yet ripe because there had been no application
of the law in question. See id. at 497-98.
" See 342 U.S. at 496-97 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 508-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Black viewed the Feinberg Law as another attempt by government to "supervise and
limit the flow of ideas into the minds of men," the tendency of which "is to mould people
into a common intellectual pattern." Id. at 497 (Black, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This position was later adopted by the major-
ity. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
- 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
5 Id. at 184 n.1 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 37.1-.8 (West Supp. 1952) (repealed
1953)).
" See 344 U.S. at 188-91.
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clause,6' and the three dissenters in Adler concurred in the judg-
ment.6 2 Justice Frankfurter's eloquent concurring opinion supported
the concept of academic freedom as a separate and identifiable
constitutional interest.6
3
The most significant academic freedom decision is Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 14 which involved another attempt to purge communists.
The New Hampshire Attorney General undertook, on behalf of the
legislature, an investigation of subversives in the stateA Mr.
Sweezy, summoned to answer questions, refused to discuss a lecture
he had given at the University of New Hampshire or to answer
questions about the Progressive Party. He based his refusal on two
grounds: (1) the irrelevance of the questions;6 and (2) a First
Amendment right not to be questioned about matters of personal
politics or philosophy." He did not invoke the Fifth Amendment
and, after defying a court order to answer, he was held in con-
tempt.6 8 The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Warren an-
nounced the result and read an opinion in which Justices Black,
'3 See id. at 190-92.
See id. at 192-98. The majority did not extend the full protection of the Constitution
to p~ublic employees, but it did recognize that such persons were not entirely bereft of consti-
tutional rights. "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employ-
ment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at
192.
Id. at 194-98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter wrote:
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary grades
to the university-as the priests of our democracy is . . . not to indulge in hyper-
bole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and
critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possi-
ble an enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function
by precept and practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must
be exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their
noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are
denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and
action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history
of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine,
qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of extend-
ing the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of
thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States against infraction by National or State government.
Id. at 196-97.
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
" See id. at 236-38, 245-46.
" See id. at 239-40.
See id. at 244.
See id. at 244-45.
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Douglas, and Brennan joined. The opinion recognized academic
freedom as an important concept in the democratic process,' but
the plurality based its decision on a determination that the prosecu-
tion had failed to prove that the legislature wanted answers to the
particular questions at issue0 or that the legislature had even au-
thorized the state attorney general to inquire into these matters.7'
Due process-not the First Amendment or academic free-
dom-saved Mr. Sweezy from contempt.
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, in which Justice Harlan
joined, dealt specifically with the fundamental issues of intellectual
freedom72 and political privacy.73 In his view, limitations on freedom
of thought and inquiry could be justified only in limited circumstan-
ces .
74
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to
findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of
nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is
this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeav-
ors of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which
is man and society. The problems that are the respective
preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology,
sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely depart-
mentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis,
with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For so-
ciety's good-if understanding be an essential need of so-
ciety-inquiries into these problems, speculations about them,
stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as
unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from in-
trusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of
wise government and the people's well-being, except for rea-
sons that are exigent and obviously compelling."
See id. at 250.
7 See id. at 253-55.
See id.
72 See id. at 261-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" See id. at 266-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
71 See id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Is Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter's "exigent and ob-
viously compelling" test is akin to the "clear and present danger" standard suggested by
Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In Schenck limitations
on speech were said to be justified only when there was a clear and present danger that the
speech in question would cause "substantive evils" which the government might prohibit. Id.
The Holmes test has been refined in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
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Sweezy was hardly a smashing victory for academic freedom. The
plurality's opinion was limited to rather technical questions of due
process, and the rationale would apply to any person regardless of
his connection with education. Moreover, only Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan considered Mr. Sweezy's status as a member of the
academic community to be a central concern.7" Nevertheless, Jus-
tice Frankfurter's opinions in Sweezy and Wieman did begin to
provide a constitutional framework for the recognition of academic
freedom as a protectable right.
The tenuous nature of the "right" became apparent the next term
in Beilan v. Board of Public Education,7 which involved a public
school teacher who refused to answer questions posed to him by his
superintendent about reports of his association with communists.
He was warned that the inquiry concerned his fitness as a teacher
and might lead to his dismissal, but he still refused to answer. In a
subsequent administrative review of the matter, his refusal to an-
swer was found to be sufficient evidence of incompetence to justify
dismissal, regardless of his beliefs. The Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal,7" reasoning that due process had been afforded the
teacher and that he had a duty, which he had not fulfilled, to be
frank and candid in responding to questions.79 The Court seemed
unaware that inquiries into personal beliefs and activities may
themselves impermissibly chill constitutional rights, especially
when an inquiry is made by one's superior and a wrong answer may
lead to dismissal. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan voted with the
majority. Apparently the superintendent's methods of inquiry were,
in their view, "exigent and compelling."8 0
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
11 See 354 U.S. at 262-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Whittaker took no part
in the decision. Id. at 255. Justices Clark and Burton dissented. Id. at 267.
357 U.S. 399 (1958).
Id. at 409.
7, See id. at 405-07.
' See 354 U.S. 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); text accompanying note 75 supra. Chief
Justice Warren dissented, 357 U.S. at 411-12, as did Justices Douglas and Black, id. at 412-
16, and Brennan, id. at 417-25. In a companion case, the Court upheld the dismissal of a
subway conductor for his refusal to discuss allegations of his communist connections. Lerner
v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958). The impact of Sweezy was further limited by Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), in which the Court upheld the contempt conviction of a
college psychology professor for his refusal to answer questions posed by the House Committee
on Un-American Activities.
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For nearly a decade, few cases of significance to the issue of aca-
demic freedom were decided. In 1967 New York's Feinberg Laws'
was again challenged in Keyishian v. Board of Regents."2 Although
Adler was not expressly overruled, its precedential value was cer-
tainly minimized. The majority specifically agreed that public em-
ployment could not be conditioned upon the surrender of constitu-
tional rights that could not otherwise be abridged by direct govern-
ment action.Y The law was found to be impermissibly vague;84 such
a law could only be enforced if its sanctions were limited to knowing
membership and a specific intent to further illegal aims.85 The ma-
jority also noted the existence of academic freedom as a definable
legal interest:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not toler-
ate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.88
The four dissenters, Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White,
did not agree that the First Amendment was implicated by the
Feinberg Law. They viewed the case as posing the question whether
a government was required to employ persons who advocated the
overthrow of the government-not just the particular governing offi-
cials but the form of government itself-to teach its next generation
of citizens. 7
S ee notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
", 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
See id. at 605-08.
, See id. at 598-99, 604.
See id. at 606-09.
" Id. at 603.
" The dissenting opinion by Justice Clark, in which the other three dissenters joined,
defined the issue as follows:
The issue here is a very narrow one. It is not freedom of speech, freedom of thought,
freedom of press, freedom of assembly, or of association, even in the Communist
Party. It is simply this: May the State provide that one who, after a hearing with
full judicial review, is found to have'wilfully and deliberately advocated, advised,
or taught that our Government should be overthrown by force or violence or other
unlawful means; or to have wilfully and deliberately printed, published, etc., any
book or paper that so advocated and to have personally advocated such doctrine
himself; or to have wilfully and deliberately become a member of an organization
that advocates such doctrine, is prima facie disqualified from teaching in its
university?
Id. at 628-29 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissenters answered this
rhetorical question in the affirmative.
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The last of the major communist and loyalty oath cases to reach
the Court was Whitehill v. Elkins,"" decided the same year as
Keyishian. The petitioner in Whitehill had been offered a university
teaching position in Maryland. He brought a declaratory judgment
action seeking to be relieved of the state requirement that teachers
take a loyalty oath as a condition of employment. The Supreme
Court invalidated the Maryland statute because the definition of
subversive groups was unconstitutionally vague. 9 One could hon-
estly believe himself not to be a member of any subversive group,
and so sweai, and yet be found guilty of membership under the
statute. Thus, the fear of perjury alone could have a "chilling ef-
fect." In his opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas also noted that
loyalty oaths created a continuing problem of surveillance which
was destructive to the teaching profession.'
During the 1960s and early 1970s, several cases dealt with issues
of considerable significance to teachers and scholars. In Epperson
v. Arkansas9' the Supreme Court finally agreed that a state could
not prohibit the teaching of evolution. 2 The Court found the Arkan-
sas statute violative of the First Amendment's prohibition of an
establishment of religion without ruling on the question of academic
freedom. Another notable decision was Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School District,9 3 in which the Court gave constitutional
sanction to students who wore black armbands as a symbol of pro-
test against the Vietnam War."
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized aca-
- 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
See id. at 61.62.
See id. at 59-60.
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Z See id. at 103, 109. See also Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
" Id. at 514. The proper role of secondary school teachers became a much debated issue
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See generally Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right
of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976);
Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search for Standards, 8
GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher
and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1032 (1971). Other cases considering
significant constitutional issues in an academic context included Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Ahem v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Mailloux
v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Gary
v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358
(D. Ore. 1976).
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demic freedom as a constitutional right, the foregoing decisions
demonstrate that the concept is inextricably intertwined with
clearly identified and traditionally respected constitutional inter-
ests that are protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
Thus, academic freedom may fairly be characterized as having a
constitutional dimension and the aura of a constitutional right.
Perhaps the most significant legal recognition of academic free-
dom has developed collaterally through the application of a judicial
"abstention doctrine" in cases involving universities, especially in
matters related to questions of scholastic standards. 5 The reason for
this approach was simply stated by a federal court in Vermont:
"[fln matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely
qualified by training and experience to judge the qualifications of a
student, and efficiency of instruction depends in no small degree
upon the school faculty's freedom from interference from other non-
educational tribunals." 8 The Supreme Court recently applied this
"abstention doctrine" in a university context in Board of Curators
v. Horowitz.17 Charlotte Horowitz, a student at the University of
Missouri-Kansas City Medical School, was dismissed for academic
reasons. After exhausting her intra-university appeals for reinstate-
ment, she filed a civil rights action against the university in which
she contended that she had not been afforded constitutionally man-
dated standards of due process. 8 The Supreme Court upheld the
medical school's dismissal of Ms. Horowitz:
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historicjudgment of educators and thereby formalize the academic
dismissal process by requiring a hearing. The educational pro-
cess is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a
continuing relationship between faculty and students, "one in
which the teacher must occupy many roles-educator, adviser,
friend, and, at times, parent-substitute." . . . This is espe-
' See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Mustell v. Rose, 282
Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Coffelt v. Nicholson, 224 Ark. 176,
272 S.W.2d 309 (1954); Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971); Bluett v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134
N.E.2d 635 (1956); Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert. denied, 319 U.S.
748 (1942); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932); Frank v. Marquette Univ.,
209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932).
Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D. Vt. 1965).
435 U.S. 78 (1978).
A The suit was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The University of Missouri-Kansas City
is a public institution and therefore the state action requirement was satisfied.
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cially true as one advances through the varying regimes of the
educational system, and the instruction becomes both more
individualized and more specialized. . . . We decline to fur-
ther enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community
and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the
faculty-student relationship."
Academic freedom may not have been accorded the status of a
separately recognized constitutional right, but it has had a de facto
recognition through this type of judicial abstention. The courts have
at least recoghized that some matters are peculiarly within the prov-
ince of the academy rather than the judiciary.
C. Academic Freedom-The Current Legal Status
Judicial reluctance to recognize academic freedom as a separate
constitutional right is not necessarily to be condemned, however,
because such recognition could raise serious problems. To create a
newly defined "right" of a constitutional dimension would be un-
necessary and possibly harmful for three reasons: (1) a democratic
society should not as a general rule create castes whose members
acquire certain constitutional rights unavailable to society at
large;' ® (2) the definition of such a right may narrow its protection
by impliedly, if not expressly, excluding interests, activities, or per-
435 U.S. at 90 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594 (1975) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing)). The Court reaffirmed that at least minimal due process standards should be followed
in conducting disciplinary proceedings because there the relationship is more clearly adver-
sarial. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), a case involving the suspension of a student
from public school, the Court ruled that the Constitution requires "that the student be given
oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of
the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. at
581. Similarly, a teacher who has a contract, or at least a clearly implied promise of continued
employment in a public institution, is entitled to due process in connection with a dismissal
or the nonrenewal of employment. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972);
Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569-75 (1972) (professor not entitled to hearing on nonrenewal of his contract in the absence
of express or implied promise of continued employment, despite allegations that he was
dismissed for expressing controversial views).
"I The equal protection and due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments provide a general framework for ensuring that the constitutional rights of various
groups are not arbitrarily removed or limited. Nevertheless, there has been a long debate over
whether the acceptance of certain privileges, for example, government employment, justifies
limitations on the exercise of rights enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226-27 (1977); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-60 (1976). See
generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARv. L. RV. 1439 (1968).
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sons who are not within the definition; °'0 and (3) the interests with
which academics are concerned can receive adequate constitutional
protection through a thoughtful and sophisticated application of
traditionally recognized First Amendment rights.0 2
The first reason is based on the simple proposition that in a de-
mocracy all citizens have equal citizenship rights. The antibias leg-
islation discussed in this article is part of a continuing effort to
vindicate that notion. Equality among citizens is inconsistent with
the idea that one class of citizens is entitled to a certain
constitutional right to which other citizens are not entitled.' 3 Cer-
tainly there are inequities in the privileges, usually economic, ac-
corded certain individuals, but whatever those inequities may be
they are not usually matters of constitutional concern.10
M' This point is similar to the arguments against a detailed Bill of Rights made by
various framers of the Constitution who feared that the concept of liberty might be narrowed
by a listing of its components. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton); Debates, The
Pennsylvania Convention, November 28, 1787, in II THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION OF THE CONSTITTmON 388 (M. Jensen ed. 1976). The supporters of the Bill of Rights
obviously prevailed, and the Amendments have provided a reasonably effective means of
protection against inappropriate governmental intrusions. Thus the opponents were arguably
mistaken, but we do not know what the result might have been had a "natural rights" concept
of liberty prevailed, nor do we know how successful the opposition was in causing the various
amendments to be as broadly worded as they are. The breadth of the concepts contained in
the simple language of the amendments did a great deal to provide a basis for an expansive
reading.
In a more modem context there has been considerable debate about the desirability of
shield laws and court decisions for the protection of reporters' confidential sources. See, e.g.,
Houston, Editors Split Over Need For Absolute Shield Law, 106 EDITOR AND PUBLISHER 9
(1973); Symposium-The Question of Federal "Newsmen's Shield" Legislation, 52 CONG.
Di. 131 (1973). This is one aspect of the ongoing argument about the status of the press under
the First Amendment, a debate which is particularly instructive on the question of whether
defining rights necessarily limits them. Compare Stewart, "Or of the Press, "26 HASTINGS L.J.
631 (1975) with First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
M This point is taken basically from the ideas expressed by Professor Emerson. See T.
EMERSON, supra note 48, at 616-26.
'M This does not mean that societal institutions should not reward individuals or groups
in return for meritorious service or for quality work. Democratic theory does not preclude the
New York Yankees from paying Ron Guidry more than a minor league relief pitcher. In
addition, the important and often desirable use of status as an ordering construct should not
be overlooked. See generally Friedmann, Some Reflections on Status and Freedom, in ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 222 (R. Newman ed. 1962); Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974); Rehbinder', Status, Contract, and the
Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REv. 941 (1971).
101 The Supreme Court has indicated that wealth (or poverty) is not a "suspect" classifi-
cation for purposes of equal protection or due process analysis. See San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). Indigency may, however, give rise to a
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A pragmatic reason for refusing to create a separate constitutional
right of academic freedom is that the existence of a privileged class
of academics might raise the ire of those not privileged.'"' Since
universities are dependent for their very existence upon the good
will of the society in which they are situated, such a privileged class
might alienate public and private benefactors. To regain their favor,
universities would have to tailor their policies to please the money-
givers. Such indirect control is the essence of the current dilemma
facing universities, and there is no reason to exacerbate the problem
by seeking a 'constitutionally privileged status.
The second reason-that defining a right of academic freedom
might narrow the concept-derives, in part, from the problem of
determining who is entitled to enjoy the new right. Would there be
a hierarchy of statuses from kindergarten instructor through ten-
ured full professor? What would be the relative rights and privileges
of students, administrators, and staff personnel? Would university
trustees share in the privilege? Would it be lost upon retirement or
during a leave of absence? To ask the questions makes the point.'"'
constitutional claim if it causes one to be denied a protected opportunity, such as access to
civil courts or the appeal of a criminal case. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81
(1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963). There is certainly no doubt that a
poor person may have more difficulty in vindicating his rights than a wealthy person, but
the rights themselves are identical regardless of the economic situation of the citizen.
,0 See Comment, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional Context, 40 U. COLO. L. Rv.
600 (1968).
I' From a technical point of view, there is also the problem of deciding which constitu-
tional provision to use for the creation of such a new right. A separately recognized right might
be a derivative of several provisions found in the "penumbra" of explicit rights, much like
the concept of privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Academics,
unlike journalists, do not have their own specific constitutional clause. The press can claim
a special status by pointing to language in the Constitution directly relating to journalism.
See Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731 (1977); Stewart, supra note
101. But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 795-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Nevertheless, the establishment of consti-
tutional protection for the privileges claimed as incidental to that status is not easy. The cases
on reporters' refusals to disclose their sources are illustrative. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law-Evidence-No Testimo-
nial Privilege for Newsmen, 51 N.C.L. Rv. 562 (1973); Note, Reporters and Their Sources:
The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970). Attempts
to assert a similar privilege for academic researchers have not met with much success, al-
though it should be noted that the courts have not unqualifiedly rejected the constitutional
arguments in favor of extending such a privilege to professors. See, e.g., United States v. Doe,
460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied., 411 U.S. 909 (1973); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp.
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The focus should be on the protection of academic freedom interests
regardless of the particular status of the individual. At stake is the
freedom to engage in unfettered inquiry and creative intellectual
pursuits and to take part in the whole array of cultural, social,
political, intellectual, and religious activities offered by our society
without fear of job reprisals so long as professional responsibilities
are fulfilled.
The third reason for denying academic freedom constitutional
status is premised on the idea, advanced most eloquently by
Thomas Emerson, that the First Amendment is intended to protect
not only speech, newspapers, or religious groups, but also to protect
and promote the development of an entire system of free expression
and free inquiry including all the necessary components of such a
system.' Emerson identifies the university as an important compo-
nent in this scheme."8 He does not disavow the notion of a separate
930 (D. Mass. 1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972); United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass. 1971). See generally Note, The
Public Scholar and The First Amendment: A Compelling Need for Compelling Testimony?,
40 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 995 (1972); Comment, Academic Researchers and the First Amend-
ment: Constitutional Protection for Their Confidential Sources?, 14 SAN DiEao L. Rav. 876
(1977).
'1 See notes 38 & 48 supra and accompanying text. There have been many splendid
writings on First Amendment theory. Three of the best are Z. CHMFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1941); A. MEIKLEJoHN, PoLrrcAL FREEDOM (1960); and the most recent by
Thomas Emerson, where the author states:
A system of freedom of expression, operating in a modem democratic society, is a
complex mechanism. At its core is a group of rights assured to individual members
of the society. This set of rights, which makes up our present-day concept of free
expression, includes the right to form and hold beliefs and opinions on any subject,
and to communicate ideas, opinions, and information through any medium-in
speech, writing, music, art, or in other ways. To some extent it involves the right
to remain silent. From the obverse side it includes the right to hear the views of
others and to listen to their version of the facts. It encompasses the right to inquire
and, to a degree, the right of access to information. As a necessary corollary, it
embraces the right to assemble and to form associations, that is, to combine with
others in joint expression. . . . This interrelated set of rights, principles, practices,
and institutions can be considered a system, at least in a rough way, because it has
an overall unity of purpose and operation. To view it in this manner facilitates the
development of the rules for its governance, for such rules must be derived from
the basic functions and dynamics of the system. Furthermore, they must accommo-
date the system of freedom of expression to other features of our national life.
T. EMERSON, supra note 48, at 3-4.
"I In Emerson's view:
ultimately any system of freedom of expression depends upon the existence of an
educated, independent, mature citizenry. Consequently realization of the objec-
tives of the First Amendment requires educational institutions that produce gradu-
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and identifiable right; 9 rather, he argues that the existing constitu-
tional structure is sufficient to provide a basis for protecting the
essential principles of academic freedom."10 Protecting academic
freedom by integrating its components into the array of interests
that fall under the general protection of the First Amendment is
more conducive to the ultimate safeguarding of that freedom, as a
matter of both constitutional and societal concern, than would be
the creation of some new and undefined right for a small, privileged
class."'
D. Academic Freedom-The Interests Involved and Federal
Intrusion
What are the activities in the university that require the develop-
ment of a system conducive to intellectual freedom? How may the
intrusive impact of federal enforcement procedures be minimized in
such a system? Taking the first question, let us consider the range
of interests in a university.
Paramount among the purposes of an educational institution is
the transmittal of knowledge." 2 The state has a direct interest in
this purpose because society profits from an educated population,
and there is a need to maintain minimal standards."' Nevertheless,
ates who are trained in handling ideas, judging facts and argument, thinking inde-
pendently, and generally participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas.
Hence the First Amendment could be said to require the kind of educational insti-
tutions that are capable of producing such results.
T. EMERSON, supra note 48, at 613.
' See id. at 611-16.
o See id. at 616-26.
A systematic approach serves to integrate the interests of the university community
more effectively into the value system of society at large. Teaching and research are valuable
to society; they help create an educated citizenry which is useful for the maintenance of a
rational social order. They lead to new discoveries and to the full development of individual
creativity. Admittedly, this is a utilitarian approach. For those who wish to pursue the
problems of liberal democracies in the context of philosophical and jurisprudential arguments
concerning theories of social contract, natural rights and the like, there is a lively literature.
See, e.g., R. DwoRKi, TAING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. NOzicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA (1974); J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Symposium-Jurisprudence, 11 GA.
L. REv. 969 (1977).
"I Governmental policies may directly interfere with this most fundamental aspect of
the educational process even at the most elementary levels. The debate over whether to allow
the teaching of theories of evolution is a good example. See notes 91-92 supra and accompany-
ing text.
"3 Even the simplest kinds of commercial transactions-buying car insurance or grocer-
ies-require minimal levels of literacy and arithmetic skills. Moreover, responsible citizen-
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state intrusions, whether through direct regulation or the imple-
mentation of some other policy or program, can be destructive to the
teaching function unless they are carefully circumscribed."4
At the university level, where there is less direct interference with
the teaching function,"- research is the more likely area for contro-
versy because creative intellectual inquiry often challenges the sta-
tus quo. As one commentator has noted, "the scholar is necessarily
a disturbing person, since he is professionally committed to raising
questions about accepted ideas and institutions which, as in the
case of Socrates, are bound to evoke reactions ranging from uneasi-
ness to alarm.""' 6
ship depends upon an ability to understand issues and to articulate opinions, which ability
depends in turn upon a sound education. See generally Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
196-98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"I See notes 133-35 infra and accompanying text. A recent article is instructive on this
point. See Hodgson, Sex, Texts and the First Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 173 (1976). Hodg-
son argued that HEW regulations issued pursuant to Title IX of the 1972 Education Act
Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), should be broadened to govern the selection of texts
for elementary and secondary schools in order to minimize "sex-role stereotyping," which the
author considered to be widespread in teaching materials. The author summarily dismissed
First Amendment arguments to the contrary: "Since school board members select texts in
their capacities as officials charged with educational judgments, not as individuals engaged
in self-expression, they have no protected First Amendment interest in non-regulation of sex-
stereotyping in the texts they select." Id. at 180. The commentator thus ignored the implica-
tions of such an approach for the First Amendment rights of teachers. See generally Academic
Freedom, supra note 29, at 1080-81; notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
I' There is no requirement that persons attend college and there is no state mandated
curriculum, although the requirements for certification in particular professions may have an
impact on curricula.
"' Fellman, Academic Freedom inAmerican Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 3, 9 (1961). Govern-
ing authorities are not the only ones who may be disturbed by research activities. The ongoing
debate about the Jensen-Shockley race intelligence theory is an example of an intra-academy
furor which has sometimes been as destructive of individual free expression as any govern-
mental intrusion. Dr. William Shockley became the central figure in a cause c~l~bre at Yale
several years ago. After a series of invitations and revocations of invitations, Dr. Shockley
finally appeared on campus to address a student group. His thesis was that intelligence is
genetically based and that it varies from race to race by reason of genetic coding regardless
of cultural or environmental factors. There were demonstrations in advance of Shockley's
appearance, he was shouted down when he arrived in the lecture hall, and he was never
allowed to speak. The affair was of considerable concern to all segments of the university,
and Yale's President Brewster appointed d special committee to investigate the vitality of
free speech on the campus. The committee's report, known generally as the "Woodward
Report" after the distinguished historian C. Vann Woodward who chaired the committee,
concluded that
[tihe primary function of a university is to discover and disseminate knowledge
by means of research and teaching. To fulfill this function a free interchange of
ideas is necessary not only within its walls but with the world beyond as well. It
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In addition to teaching, researching, writing, and learning,"7
members of an academic community may be engaged in political,
artistic, religious, or cultural pursuits within and without the con-
fines of the university. Such activities directly or indirectly further
the central purposes of teaching and learning by enriching the lives
of the participants and by contributing to society at large.
How are these various activities to be encouraged and protected
so that teachers and students can most effectively approach the
ideal of the university? Each intrusion by the government into the
academy to effect some governmental policy should be analyzed in
terms of its impact on the various components of the system which
exists for the protection and nurture of intellectual freedom. In the
context of the enforcement of antibias legislation, this problem may
be addressed by considering a hypothetical case of alleged discrimi-
nation and the possible procedures for its investigation.
To take a fairly typical problem, assume that a student who has
been dismissed for academic reasons files a complaint with the ap-
follows that the university must do everything possible to ensure within it the
fullest degree of intellectual freedom. The history of intellectual growth and discov-
ery clearly demonstrates the need for unfettered freedom, the right to think the
unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable. To
curtail free expression strikes twice at intellectual freedom, for whoever deprives
another of the right to state unpopular views necessarily also deprives others of the
right to listen to those views.
Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, Report, 4 HUMAN IIGHTs 357 (1975). See
generally Cronbach, Five Decades of Public Controversy Over Mental Testing, in
CONTROVERSIES AND DECISIONS: THE SOCIAL SCIENCsE AND PUBuC POLICY 123 (C. Frankel ed.
1976); Ezrahi, The Jensen Controversy: A Study in the Ethics and Politics of Knowledge in
Democracy, in id. at 149.
"I Although learning never ceases, it is obvious that the greatest number of "learners"
at any educational institution are the students, and it is important to recognize their roles in
both teaching and research. Some students, particularly at the graduate level, may be en-
gaged in teaching and in significant independent research. Insofar as those functions are
concerned, the students' interests are essentially coextensive with those of their professors.
In addition, there is a definable interest in learning that is as much a part of a system of free
expression as is teaching. The Germans certainly recognized this interest in the concept of
Lernfreiheit, see notes 28-35 supra and accompanying text, and it is consistent with the
developing constitutional protection of the "right to know" as a necessary component of free
expression. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-22 (1975). But see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588
(1978), in which the Supreme Court decided that the right to know does not require govern-
ments to grant access to information and facilities under their control. See also In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Baker, Do Lawyers
Have a First Amendment Right to Solicit?, 64 A.B.A.J. 364 (1978).
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propriate government agency, claiming that his dismissal was ra-
cially motivated. What kinds of information will government inves-
tigators want in order to determine whether or not there is any basis
for the charge? '" 8 Clearly the government agents will want to review
the complainant's own file and, presumably, the complainant will
waive his own rights of confidentiality under the Buckley Amend-
ment."9 In addition, the following kinds of records may be useful:
(1) Regulations concerning academic standards;
(2) Regulations governing the procedures for academic dis-
missals;
(3) Minutes of any committee concerned with the dismissal of the
complainant, including all records available to the committee;
(4) Minutes of the groups adopting the pertinent regulations and
approving the ultimate dismissal of the student;
(5) Statistics broken down by race as to: (a) number of students
admitted; (b) number of matriculants; (c) number of students in
academic difficulty; and (d) number of students excluded for aca-
demic reasons, all for a certain period of time prior to the alleged
instance of discrimination;
(6) Grades of all students in the courses taken by the complain-
ant, by race;
(7) Access to the examination questions and answers of all stu-
dents in the courses taken by the complainant;
(8) Records pertaining to the disposition of other "academic"
cases considered by the appropriate individuals or committees for
a certain period of time.' 20
Furthermore, the investigators may want to interview the complain-
ant's teachers, some of his fellow students, and the members of the
faculty or administration who have responsibility for academic dis-
missals. A charge of discrimination necessarily implies a difference
"' Racial discrimination is simply an example. Similar questions could arise in connec-
tion with charges of sex or handicap discrimination, although the investigation of the latter
might require a review of medical records. Such review would involve doctor-patient problems
of confidentiality as well.
"' See Section IV, infra.
' This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. It reflects the actual requests made by HEW
officials in connection with the investigation of a similar case.
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in treatment; therefore, data concerning the treatment of the com-
plainant's peers will be especially useful.
Such requests for information will be disruptive of normal sched-
ules and will require the time of administrative personnel and var-
ious faculty members. A refusal to comply with a request solely
because it is bothersome, however, would not be justified. Instead,
the reasonableness of the request must be determined in the context
of the purpose for which the request is made. Is the requested infor-
mation relevant to the inquiry? Is it likely to lead to an answer to
the allegation of racial bias? If the request is reasonable because it
relates to data which are, or may be, relevant, then it must be asked
whether requiring the institution, or certain of its personnel, to pro-
vide the information will be unduly burdensome. To make this de-
termination, the academic community's interest in maintaining an
environment conducive to intellectual pursuits must be balanced
against the government's need to effectuate its policies by obtaining
the data in the form requested. If academic freedom is a component
of a system of free expression, and if the university is the environ-
ment in which that component exists, then the interest on that side
of the balance is one of constitutional dimensions. Thus, the balance
should weigh in favor of the university.
The antibias statutes and regulations provide a framework for
assisting certain groups of individuals who have been denied oppor-
tunities to obtain education and employment. These statutes mani-
fest governmental attempts to secure equality of opportunity and
are consistent with the basic purposes of the equal protection and
due process clauses.'2' The statutes and regulations are not, how-
ever, enabling acts for specific constitutional rights, even though
their policies seek to vindicate constitutionally protected interests.
Academic freedom, as a component of a system of free expression,
must be balanced against the pursuit of important statutory poli-
cies. If all else is equal, the balance must be struck in favor of
protecting the constitutional interest in free expression.'22
" Works discussing the meanings and purposes of the due process and equal protection
clauses are numerous. See, e.g., Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection, 55 N.C.L. REv. 541 (1977); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341 (1949).
"2 Otherwise the supremacy clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, would be meaningless. It
is necessary, however, to distinguish between public and private institutions. A violation of
an antibias statute by a public university may be an unconstitutional violation of equal
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Aside from the constitutional issue, a practical reason for skewing
the balance in favor of the university is that some information might
be useful but not necessary to the investigation of the matter. Com-
parative data-grades by race, matriculants and graduates by race,
and academic dismissals by race-may certainly be relevant and
helpful in ascertaining the truth of the complaint. If, however, the
complaint's validity may be determined by a review of procedures
that are a matter of public record and by a few interviews, then the
university should be justified in refusing to provide additional infor-
mation. Such a limitation on inquiry would serve the basic purpose
of the investigation and would avoid confrontations between the
government and the university on the issue of academic freedom.
Many cases have used a balancing test to determine whether a
particular statute, policy, or procedure is consistent with the First
Amendment.'23 These cases provide a useful framework for analyz-
ing the initial conflict between academic freedom and the govern-
ment's interest in pursuing a certain social policy. They are not very
useful, however, in determining the factual issues of relevance and
burdensomeness which may be involved in a particular case. The
only sources of significant help in this determination are the numer-
ous cases dealing with issues of relevance and burdensomeness in
discovery proceedings pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or similar state procedural rules. '24 The general purpose of
discovery is to ensure that each party knows as much as possible
about the adversary's case in order to simplify trials, avoid surprise,
and provide a basis for settlement.'2 5 The tendency is, therefore, to
protection rights. The balance would then have to be struck evenly, and the outcome would
vary from case to case depending on the degree to which one right as opposed to another had
been invaded.
I There are dozens of First Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court has directly
or indirectly applied a balancing test. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409-14
(1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969). Even
the "clear and present danger" test suggested by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919), is itself a form of balancing test. The Holmes test has been substantially
modified. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For an application of
balancing in a different context, see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). One of the
classic statements in support of a balancing theory appears in Justice Frankfurter's concur-
ring opinion in Dennis, 341 U.S. at 517-61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"I1 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) establishes the general threshold criterion of relevance. For a
collection of the cases discussing relevance under rule 26, see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2008-2009 (1970 & Supp. 1977). As to burdensomeness,
see id. § 2174.
"I See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 124, § 2001; 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL
1978]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
put a heavier burden on the party seeking to avoid discovery than
on the requesting party,' 8 but the contrary is usually true when the
resisting party invokes a well-recognized privilege, such as that of
attorney and client.'2 7 Cases in this latter category may provide the
best analogy to the university-government conflict.
Once limitations on governmental inquiries are proposed, how are
they to be implemented? The regulations simply direct the govern-
ment to investigate, without providing a mechanism to resolve con-
flicts arising from an objection to a request for data. If a university
refuses to provide the requested materials, it risks an unfavorable
report which may eventually lead to financial sanctions. Thus, an
institution is faced with the necessity of seeking an immediate judi-
cial determination.' 28 The most likely action would be a suit to
enjoin the investigation pending a decision on the validity of the
university's refusal to answer the interrogatories. An alternative
would be a suit for declaratory relief, if the prerequisites of the
Declaratory Judgment Act 2 1 could be met. Such expensive and
time-consuming litigation could be largely avoided by the promul-
gation of an additional regulation creating a mechanism for chal-
lenging information requests. The institution should be required to
give specific reasons for nondisclosure, and if the matter is not re-
solved informally, it could be submitted to an administrative law
judge. The government should have the burden of proving the ne-
cessity of the disclosure, and a regulatory or statutory mechanism
for judicial review should be required. The administrative law
judge's decision should be treated as an interlocutory order which,
under appropriate circumstances, could be certified for immediate
review by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare or, if
Congress should so provide, for direct judicial review.'30
PRACTICE, 1 26.02 (1976).
12 For a general discusson and a collection of the cases, see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 126, §§ 2007-2009.
"' See 8 C. WmRHT & A. MILLER, supra note 124, §§ 2016-2020; 4 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 125, 26.60.
'1 Ironically, the Buckley Amendment, discussed in Section IV infra, may turn out to
be helpful. If there is a reasonable basis for refusing to disclose materials that come within
the protection of the Buckley Amendment, then it may currently provide the safest and,
practically speaking, one of the most effective means for avoiding government inquiries.
Another obvious escape from the dilemma is through negotiation. This discussion assumes
that negotiations have proven unsatisfactory.
' 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976).
'' Both sides will usually benefit if the dispute can be kept from the courts, not because
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To this point the principal focus has been on institutional respon-
ses to government requests and institutional attempts to maintain
a system conducive to intellectual liberty. In addition to the protec-
tion of the system as a whole, however, the university must be
sensitive to the particular interests and rights of its individual mem-
bers.'3 ' A request for information by government investigators may
directly intrude upon an individual's intellectual freedom. A re-
quest to review examination questions and answers illustrates the
principal issues involved. If a charge of bias derives from an aca-
demic problem, then the student's examination performance is di-
rectly implicated, and the investigators may wish to undertake a
comparative study of examinations. 32
The relationship between a teacher and student is delicate and
sensitive. If the relationship is to be effective, the teacher must be
able to rely upon the fundamental honesty of the students. The
students must trust the professor to write an examination which
fairly tests them on the materials covered and to grade the results
as objectively as possible. 33 When a third party enters the relation-
ship to review the questions and answers, the implication arises that
one party in the relationship has violated the trust. Care should be
taken to avoid such an implication unless clearly warranted, be-
cause it will limit the intellectual freedom of both teachers and
students by reducing their relationship to one of mutual mistrust in
which learning becomes an adversarial process with a third party
sitting in judgment. When the third party is an outside agent of the
federal government, the possibility of destroying the trust is greater,
because government intervention suggests that the alleged abuse is
significant enough to be a matter of public concern at the federal
level.
of any lack of faith in judges, but rather because most litigation takes such an extraordinarily
long time to be completed that it has generally become an unsatisfactory means of resolving
disputes.
"' See, e.g., O'Neil, supra note 36, at 538-43. See generally Corporation of Haverford
College v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66
Cal.2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
11 A specific request for exam papers and questions was made by HEW investigators in
one case in which the author was briefly involved. The request was refused. As of this writing,
nothing further has come of the refusal.
"3 This model supposes essay type examinations. Clearly, objective examinations in a
quantifiable discipline should not be subject to any of the personal prejudices of the grader,
though the questions which are asked may tend to reflect the bias of the professor.
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Furthermore, the review of examination questions and answers by
an agent of the federal government insults the intellectual integrity
of both teachers and students. How is an agent of the Office of Civil
Rights to make a valid determination of what constitutes a fair
question or answer in a course he has not taken? Similarly, he is not
in a position to compare with any degree of certainty the relative
merits of different papers. From a purely practical point of view,
little can be gleaned from such review unless there are egregious
examples of bias.'34
Allowing government investigators access upon request to exami-
nation questions and answers in the investigation of a bias com-
plaint can lead to several results, any of which will be detrimental
to the system of academic freedom:
(1) The trust between professor and student will be lessened be-
cause each student might become the source of an adversarial in-
quiry. This will be particularly true of female, handicapped, or mi-
nority students, and will thereby highlight the presence of such
students in a way which impedes their full integration into the
academic system.
(2) Students and professors will be aware that their work might
be subject to review by an outsider. The impact of this awareness
will be most clearly felt by the professor. The result will likely be
mediocrity and a minimization of creative exploration of new tech-
niques and ideas.
(3) Professors, in particular, may have a continuing fear of re-
prisal for the exercise of personal judgment.
(4) Professors may tend to discard examination papers and ques-
tions soon after the examination period, and the availability of these
papers to students as pedagogical tools will be lost.'35
-' The method of examination is a different question, but it stands to reason that a deaf
student should not be given an oral exam, that a blind student should have a reader and the
option to dictate his responses, and that special accommodations should be afforded a quadri-
plegic. If one professor consistently gives bad grades to all his female students and the
performance of those women is demonstrably better than average, further investigation would
be warranted.
'l This would be a normal response. Even if there is no reason to hide anything in the
exams, there may be a desire to avoid the inconvenience of disputes about whether they
should be reviewed.
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The examination issue is one of many that might be raised. It is
conceivable that investigators may want to review reading lists,
curricula, degree requirements, teaching methods, and other mat-
ters which bear directly upon the relationship of student and
teacher. Comparative review of such matters by an outsider will
drive another wedge into the student-teacher relationship and will
be contrary to the usual judicial response of abstention from aca-
demic matters.3
In summary, the concept of academic freedom and the various
interests subsumed therein should be considered as one of the many
components of a system of free expression. 37 Scholars and students
regularly engage in the clearly protected forms of expression that are
at the heart of the First Amendment. The university has primary
responsibility for nurturing and protecting academic freedom. To do
so, the university should borrow from the model developed by the
Supreme Court and various commentators for the general protec-
tion of First Amendment freedoms: a given activity-lecturing,
writing, learning-should be presumed to be protected, subject only
to regulations reasonably calculated to maintain order and rational
intercourse. 38 Any inquiry, regulation, or investigation which in-
trudes into one of these protected areas should be presumed to be
improper, and the burden of justification should shift to the person
or agency making the intrusion. This model will give constitutional
protection to academic freedom and will avoid the problems likely
to result from the recognition of a separate and identifiable right.
E. Institutional Autonomy-A Separate Right?
Almost fifty years ago, Professor Zechariah Chafee published a
provocative article in which he argued that, as a general rule, the
state had no business intruding into the private affairs of nonprofit
associations. 3 He suggested that there are four issues to be consid-
ered before a court or a legislature interferes with the internal gover-
nance of such an organization:
(1) The seriousness of the consequences of an association's ac-
J See notes 42-43, 95-99 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
'' See generally notes 45-94 supra and accompanying text.
' Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993
(1930).
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tions-for example, expulsion from membership in the Moose Lodge
may be socially humiliating, 'but expulsion from the Plumber's
Union may be financially devastating;
(2) The degree to which the procedural rules of the organization
are open and conform with usual business rules;
(3) The resentment which interference is likely to cause, bal-
anced against the possible good that may result; and
(4) The value of the institution's autonomy to the health of so-
ciety.' 40
Chafee specifically included universities among the associations
which should generally be free from governmental interference.,4 As
Chafee stated, "The courts, like the legislatures, can hardly profess
to be better qualified to decide how teaching shall be carried on than
are the teachers and their administrative associates."1 2
To some extent, courts have followed the general line of Chafee's
arguments'4 3 and have been reluctant to impose policies such as
racial tolerance on purely private associations, 4  although federal
money has been denied to institutions that practice racial discrimi-
nation.4 5 The state action requirement has facilitated the decision
to abstain when courts have been faced with suits against private
colleges,' but Chafee's basic argument in favor of institutional au-
"° See id. at 1020-29.
See id. at 1028-29.
m Id. Chafee's whole thesis becomes quite clear in light of the following:
We shall be more doubtful of the probable wisdom of state participation in the
affairs of such a group if we are accustomed to think of the state itself as just one
more kind of association, which, like the others, should keep to its own functions,
and which must be judged according to the value and efficiency of the services it
renders us in return for rather high annual dues.
Id. at 1029.
See notes 95-99 supra and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private clubs); Falken.
stein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1099 (1973) (fraternal organizations); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972)
(fraternal and nonprofit organizations); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662
(E.D. Wis. 1971) (private organizations). But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
(private schools); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (com-
munity swimming pools).
"' See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem.,
529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
"I See note 27 supra.
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tonomy for private associations has continued to have considerable
impact.'47
The concept of institutional autonomy is closely related to the
right of association recognized by the Supreme Court as protected
by the First Amendment."" Joining others in a common venture is
a means of individual expression, and a group effort will often be
successful in the vindication of a particular interest where an indi-
vidual effort will fail. Universities, however, are in a significantly
different posture from many other private associations and institu-
tions' because of education's importance in American society.' .l"
' The strength of the idea is apparent even in an article which argued that there is little
reason to be overly careful of the distinctions between private and state institutions in the
application of general due process requirements. See O'Neil, Private Universities and Public
Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 155 (1970). O'Neil was unwilling to go so far as to suggest that the
distinction between private and public be entirely disregarded. There is, he recognized, a
value in autonomy in that it allows Antioch to try experimental programs that might not be
appropriate for Ohio State. Id. at 191-92.
In another fairly recent article Chafee's concerns were reiterated in the context of making
a judicial determination whether to accept certain types of cases. See Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 983 (1963):
In making the threshold determination whether the controversy in question is judi-
cially cognizable, the court must weigh conflicting considerations of policy at a high
level of generality, in much the same way as if it were deliberating whether to
recognize a novel cause of action. Consideration should be given not only to the
seriousness of the injury to the particular plaintiff, but also to the harm with which
such conduct threatens others in the plaintiff's position, the extent to which worka-
ble standards might be formulated for adjudicating such disputes, and whether
judicial action could afford meaningful relief; the court should also give considera-
tion to the weight of any existing social interest in permitting the type of conduct
of which the plaintiff complains, the burden which would be imposed on such an
association by judicial intervention in similar cases in the future, the burden on
courts were they to take cognizance of such disputes, and the extent to which such
intervention might interfere with other socially recognized values promoted by such
associations. These same considerations, but at a lower level of generality, will
influence the formulation of standards for decision on the merits.
Id. at 990. "
"I See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex rel Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 48, at
425-33; Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
" State supported schools, while not "private," are meant to be included among uni-
versities or institutions.
"1 The proposition that education is itself a constitutional right has never commanded
the support of a majority of the Supreme Court, but it has received significant minority
support. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist: v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 110-17
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The societal interest in education means that governmental intru-
sion, as a general proposition, is more easily justified when the
institution is a university than when it is a social club.
Despite the government's legitimate interest in education, the
institutional autonomy of schools should be recognized as necessary
to the nourishment of diversity and creative intellectual pursuits for
two reasons: (1) such recognition is consistent with the right of
association; and (2) the institution often provides a means f6r vindi-
cating an individual's right of free expression. No longer does the
romantic ideal of the lonesome scientist in his garage laboratory
comport with reality. Even a simple humanist needs a library. Both
are in need of the university, which often has the resources to pro-
tect a right that might be abdicated by an individual if he were left
alone."",
Questions concerning institutional autonomy will arise most often
in connection with the initial issue whether the government should
become involved at all. Since, in the case of antibias legislation, the
government is already very much involved, the question becomes
one of balancing government intervention against the institution's
interest in autonomy. The means of enforcement can bring into
question the policies and procedures of the university in a way that
challenges the autonomy of the institution as well as the individual
rights of members of the university community. Inquiries into the
racial or sexual composition of committees on academic standing or
discipline, for example, might impliedly challenge the institution's
own organizational processes. The inquiry may be valid, but there
must be a recognition of its impact on the university's autonomy
and on the totality of the academic environment.
F. The Impact of Intrusions on Privacy
Cases involving the tort of invasion of privacy have developed a
relatively broad interest in individual control over personal mat-
"' In fairness it should be noted that the government, as an institution, is often on the
side of the individual. This is especially true in bias cases involving the hiring and promotion
of faculty members. See generally Bienen, Ostriker, & Ostriker, Sex Discrimination in the
I Universities: Faculty Problems and No Solution, 2 WOMEN'S IboHTs L. REP., No. 3 at 3 (1975);
Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in University Faculty Hiring and
Promotion, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 429 (1976); Note, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations:
Private Colleges and Academic Freedom, 13 URBAN L. ANN. 107 (1977).
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ters,'5 2 but those cases have dealt with common law or statutory
causes of action rather than constitutional rights, and they therefore
provide no protection against governmental invasions.'53 Indeed, it
has been argued that recognition of a privacy tort may contradict
the First Amendment's protection of free expression.'5
On a constitutional level, Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government'55 is available
to any member of the academic community to prevent gross inva-
sions of an individual's physical space or body.'5 The more impor-
tant concern, however, is whether the penumbral constitutional
right to privacy created by the Supreme Court in the past dozen
years1 7 has any applicability. The cases forming the basis of the
right of privacy all relate to personal matters of marriage, family,
or home,"' and while information sought in a federal investigation
"I For a general history of the privacy tort and its current status in American law, see
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Hill, Defamation and Privacy, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1205, 1253-1313 (1976); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rv. 383 (1960); Shils, Privacy: Its
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 281 (1966); Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. RaV. 193 (1890).
1'3 Presumably, there could be an action against a particular official who acted beyond
the scope of his official authority and who, therefore, lost the protection of sovereign im-
munity.
'' See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TEx. L. REv. 611 (1968); Lehmann,
Triangulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development of the Remedy
in Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 543 (1976). The
tension between the privacy tort and free expression was made particularly clear in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), a case which involved the publication of a
rape-murder victim's name in violation of a Georgia statute. The publication was considered
to be privileged. See generally Hill, supra note 152, at 1257 & n. 243, 1258-64. See also Hunter
v. Washington Post, 102 DAILY WASH. L. REp. 1561 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1974).
' The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"I See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
,7 See note 106 supra.
' See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (possession of pornographic materials at home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (contraception by married couples). See generally Greenawalt, Personal Privacy
and the Law, WILSON Q., Spring 1978, at 67; Howard, The Supreme, Court and Modern
Lifestyles, id., at 55. See also Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (sale of
contraceptives to minors); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion);
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may be private in the sense that one does not want it publicly
disclosed, the governmental inquiries are not likely to intrude into
domestic affairs, sexual relationships, marital concerns, or decisions
about childbearing.59 Although the Court might expand the scope
of the right to include student-teacher relationships or other activi-
ties of persons engaged in the academic process, such expansion is
unlikely because the focus in privacy cases has been on the pecu-
liarly personal and intimate.
A more likely protection for academic privacy interests is the First
Amendment. Privacy protects, among other things, an individual's
use of the products of a system of free expression. To the extent that
the First Amendment protects the right to receive information,"'
and thereby the right to make personal decisions on the basis of
what has been communicated, it may serve as a constitutional basis
for the right to privacy.' 6 ' Viewed in this way, privacy can be treated
as yet another component of the system for the protection of aca-
demic freedom. If privacy is so treated, then the traditional balanc-
ing test can be applied to determine whether necessity demands
disclosure.
The Buckley Amendment manifests a particular federal concern
with problems of privacy for students. Aside from the protection
expressly provided by the statute, it may also serve as a basis for
the development of a privacy interest for students and teachers that
can be invoked in response to a governmental investigation.
IV. DILEMMAS POSED BY THE BUCKLEY AMENDMENT
A. Background of the Act and Pertinent Regulations
While the Constitution provides no greater protection for the pri-
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(interracial marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education).
,"I There is the possibility that such matters might become the subject of inquiry if the
government insisted on reviewing the files of cases involving comparative academic stand-
ings. Nevertheless, there is a difference between a review of a file and a statute which
prohibits or punishes a certain activity, such as a law banning the use of contraceptives. What
might give rise to an action for the tort of privacy invasion would not necessarily be a
constitutional violation.
'°° See note 117 supra.
See generally Lehmann, supra note 154, at 155-56; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 770-72 (1973); Note, Privacy in the
First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1464-68 (1973).
[Vol. 27
ANTIBIAS LEGISLATION ENFORCEMENT
vacy of students than it provides for anyone else, the Family Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, '62 generally known as the
Buckley Amendment,'6 3 creates a comprehensive framework for the
protection of the privacy of students in connection with their aca-
demic activities. The Amendment prohibits educational institu-
tions receiving federal financial assistance from disclosing much of
their information about students.'64 The Act serves two functions:
(1) it grants a student, or his parents in the case of a minor, access
to his educational records;'65 and (2) it limits the distribution of
information about a student to third parties without his prior con-
sent.'66 There are limitations on a student's access to confidential
letters of recommendation and to financial information provided by
his parents,'67 but more important for this discussion are the excep-
tions to the rules prohibiting disclosure.'68
The Act classifies the kinds of information kept by educational
institutions in two broad categories: education records' 9 and direc-
tory information.'70 Education records include all files, documents,
and other materials which an institution maintains in the normal
course of its business and which "contain information directly re-
lated to a student.''7 Directory information includes ordinary facts
about a student such as name, address, telephone number, degrees
received, his size and weight if on an athletic team, major field of
study, and awards.' 72 A university may not release education records
102 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g-1232i (1976).
"1 The principal sponsor of the legislation was former Senator James L. Buckley of New
York.
M For instance, a college may not send grade records of a student aged 18 or older to his
parents without the student's prior written consent. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1), (b)(2), (d)
(1976). The term "student" is defined as "any person with respect to whom an educational
agency or institution maintains education records or personally identifiable information, but
does not include a person who has not been in attendance at such agency or institution." Id.
§ 1232g(a)(6). For further discussion of "education records," see notes 169-74 infra and ac-
companying text. Eighteen is specifically set as the age of majority for the purposes of the
statute. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(d) (1976).
' See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (1976).
, See id. § 1232g(b)(1).
' See id. § 1232g(a)(1)(B). The right of access may be waived. See id. § 1232g (a)(1)(C).
" See id. § 1232g(b)(1)(A)-(I).
' ' See id. § 1232g(a)(4).
, See id. § 1232g(a)(5).
"7 Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i). The statute excludes from the definition of "education re-
cords" materials kept by individual teachers or administrators, certain law enforcement
records, certain employee records, and medical records. See id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iv).
"I See id. § 1232g(a)(5)(A) (1976).
1978]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
or any "personally identifiable information' 7 3 contained therein,
other than "directory information," without the prior written con-
sent of the student. 74
The limitations on disclosure, however, do not apply to requests
for information by representatives of the Comptroller General, the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, administrative heads
of federal educational agencies, or state educational authorities'" to
the extent that the requested information "may be necessary in
connection with the audit and evaluation of Federally-supported
education programs or in connection with the enforcement of the
Federal legal requirements which relate to such programs.' 7 5
Government officials are, nevertheless, required to maintain the
confidentiality of those records to which they do gain access.' 77
Neither the statute nor the regulations define the categories of
data which "may be necessary" for the audit or the enforcement of
government programs. This omission could produce a dilemma for
an institution asked to divulge information that is otherwise clearly
within the protection of the Buckley Amendment. The statute pro-
vides, however, that a refusal to supply personally identifiable infor-
mation "as a part of any applicable program, to any Federal office,
agency, department, or other third party, on the grounds that it
constitutes a violation of the right to privacy and confidentiality of
students or their parents,' '17 shall not be sufficient justification for
a termination of funds or for a delay in the consideration of funding
for the next fiscal period.'7 9 Thus, a university is partially protected
in pleading confidentiality when information is required to be fur-
nished in the normal course of a federally funded education pro-
gram. Whether this protection extends to requests for information
in connection with an investigation of an alleged violation of anti-
,71 The term "personally identifiable" is defined by the implementing regulations to
mean "that the data or information includes (a) the name of a student, the student's parent,
or other family member, (b) the address of the student, (c) a personal identifier, such as the
student's social security number or student number, (d) a list of personal characteristics
which would make the student's identity easily traceable, or (e) other information which
would make the student's identity easily traceable." 45 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1977).
17 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (1976).
See id. § 1232g(b)(1)(C); 45 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(3) (1977).
'' See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 99.35(a) (1977).
17 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 99.35(b) (1977).
';' 20 U.S.C. § 1232i(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
17 See id.
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bias regulations is unclear. Such investigative requests may not be
within the scope of the protection given universities,18 but there
have been no clarifying cases or regulations.
B. Application of the Regulations in a Hypothetical Case of Racial
Discrimination
If a university is charged with a discriminatory practice, it may
wish to volunteer information to refute the charge in an effort to
terminate the proceedings expeditiously. Unfortunately, the desire
to be cooperative and to flood the investigators with evidence sup-
porting the university's position may violate the Buckley Amend-
ment. 8 Some of the problems that may arise can be identified by
considering the hypothetical set out in Section III. The categories
of information requested by HEW officials would present a univer-
sity with an immediate and direct conflict with the policies of the
Buckley Amendment. If this conflict is to be avoided a careful anal-
ysis of the statute is necessary to determine what kinds of records
may or may not be covered. Deciding what constitutes an
"education record" and what is "necessary" for "the enforcement
of the Federal legal requirements"'' 3 is crucial.
Referring to the hypothetical list of records in Section III,184 cate-
gories (1) '" and (2) 8 should raise no problems; this information is
public and generally available. The minutes or other records of the
committee responsible for the complainant's dismissal' 87 are clearly
relevant and, if the complainant has executed a proper waiver,
these records should be made available. 8 The minutes of the fac-
"I The protection afforded by § 1232i(a) is limited to the provision of data "as a part of
any applicable program." If read narrowly, it might be applied only to programs which
require the provision of information to the government in the normal course of their operation.
The protection may not extend to a refusal to supply data about allegations of bias pursuant
to an investigation which was not a normal part of the operation of the funding program.
"I' The wholesale production of the requested information may also constitute an impro-
per intrusion into the privacy and academic freedom of other members of the university
community, as discussed in Section III, supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
ia 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3) (1976).
"' The list is set out in text accompanying note 120 supra.
J Category (1) records are copies of regulations governing academic standing. See text
accompanying note 120 supra.
I" Category (2) records are copies of regulations governing the procedures for academic
dismissals. See id.
" These records comprise category (3).
' Specifically excluded from the definition of "education records" are: "records of in-
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ulty or other group which has final authority over dismissals'"' prob-
ably raise no serious questions under the Buckley Amendment pro-
vided that unrelated materials are removed prior to disclosure. ' "
Categories (5) through (8)"'' pose the most difficult problems.
Some means of comparing the relative treatment of students is often
necessary to determine the validity of the complaint, unless the
racism or other discriminatory behavior is blatant. '12 The first prob-
lem is to define the scope of the investigation. If the student is in a
professional or graduate school which has its own admissions poli-
cies, academic standards, and dismissal procedures, the investiga-
tion logically should be limited to that school."'3 If, however, the
student is an undergraduate history major, should the inquiry be
directed only to the history department, or to the entire undergradu-
ate program?
structional, supervisory, and administrative personnel and educational personnel ancillary
thereto which are in the sole possession of the maker thereof and which are not accessible or
revealed to any other person except a substitute." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) (1976). This
exception includes materials such as a professor's notes, class records, and personal memo-
randa. If a professor who had taught the complainant also sat on the committee which
considered his dismissal, that instructor might have personal records which influenced his
own decision but which are excepted from the definition of "education records." The Buckley
Amendment apparently would not preclude the disclosure of such information. The decision
would be up to the individual professor rather than to the institution. Strangely, the disclo-
sure by the professor of any such records to his colleagues might trigger the application of
the Buckley Amendment and transform private records of a teacher into "education records."
See Carter, Harris, & Brown, Privacy in Education: Legal Implications for Educational
Researchers, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 465 (1976).
' These records comprise category (4).
,0 Unless the faculty is meeting in executive session to consider a confidential matter,
such as one relating to hiring, there is not likely to be any reason why minutes of faculty
meetings, as the official records of proceedings, should not be made available. Generally,
confidential information can be deleted.
,' Records in categories (5) through (8) include the following:
(5) Statistics broken down by race as to: (a) number of students admitted; (b)
number of matriculants; (c) number of students in academic difficulty; and (d)
number of students excluded for academic reasons, all for a certain period of time
prior to the alleged instance of discrimination;
(6) Grades of all students in the courses taken by the complainant, by race;
(7) Access to the examination questions and answers of all students in the
courses taken by the complainant;
(8) Records pertaining to the disposition of other "academic" cases considered
by the appropriate individuals or committees for a certain period of time. See text
accompanying note 120 supra.
"I For an example of overtly racist policies by a university, see Bob Jones Univ. v.
Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
10 The inquiry could be broadened were evidence uncovered which implicated other
parts of the university.
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Without some initial limitations an investigation can become in-
volved in the pursuit of information of little relevance to the subject
matter of the complaint. The argument that the scope of such an
investigation should be carefully circumscribed is closely related to
the argument that sanctions for a violation of an antibias statute
should be limited to the particular school or program in which the
violation occurs." 4 Professor O'Neil argues that discrimination in
one department may justify funding terminations that affect wholly
unrelated sections of an educational institution."' In O'Neil's view,
racism in the history department could be a sufficient justification
for a termination of federal funding to the chemistry department
even if the complainant had never taken chemistry. His concern is
the protection of institutional autonomy,'96 and he fears that chal-
lenges which seek to narrow the application of regulations to a par-
ticular department or even to a specific program within a depart-
ment may result in an unrealistic atomization of university activi-
ties. Students take courses in a variety of areas, administrative
support crosses internal boundaries, and departments have joint
interdisciplinary programs.9 7 Professor O'Neil argues that an at-
tempt to narrow the impact of such regulations may involve courts
and government agencies in an examination of university organiza-
tion and governance that would be significantly more intrusive than
the general application of restrictive regulations.' He does not sug-
gest, however, that universities should acquiesce in the wholesale
application of pervasive federal regulations that intrude upon areas
within the autonomy of the institution. Rather, he simply suggests
that the argument for limiting the regulatory impact to the specific
"I For a more complete development of this argument, see the comments of former
President Kingman Brewster of Yale University and President Derek Bok of Harvard Univer-
sity reprinted, respectively, in the YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Apr., 1976, at 34-35, and the
Harvard University Gazette, June 13, 1975, at 1, col. 2. President Davison of the University
of Georgia apparently shares the opinion of Messrs. Brewster and Bok. See note 10 supra.
"I O'Neil, supra note 36. This article was written, in part, as a response to Presidents
Brewster and Bok. Id. at 529.
'D Id. at 530-38.
"' Id. at 530-36. Typical of the kinds of joint programs are those offered by some law
and business schools which make it possible to earn both a J.D. and an M.B.A. in four years
rather than five. In cross-departmental programs such as American Studies or East European
Studies, the faculty members may be in two departments-the specialized area and a more
traditional one, such as history, economics, or political science.
I" In O'Neil's words, "any judicial approach that requires the fragmentation of an educa-
tional institution or its functions may well increase the risk of governmental intrusion." Id.
at 534.
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program where a complaint arose has weak underpinnings and may
lead to more serious problems.199
Certainly there is& an argument-that-the cross-fertilization often
significant to creative scholarship will be chilled by a fragmentation
resulting from attempts to limit the impact of government regula-
tions. Moreover, much governmental assistance supports general
university activities which are not easily separated out for investiga-
tory purposes. Insofar as regulatory enforcement procedures are con-
cerned, however, O'Neil's argument may prove too much. O'Neil
is correct that the determination of what is and what is not a
federally assisted program may require direct judicial or adminis-
trative interference with the university's internal organization, but
an initial limitation on the scope of an inquiry can generally lessen
its disruptive impact and minimize the possibility of conflicts with
the policies of the Buckley Amendment.
Consider the hypothetical claim of racial discrimination by a his-
tory student. The student himself may be able to give some direc-
tion to government investigators, but the disruptive effects of an
investigation could be lessened by limiting inquiries to the under-
graduate history department, or perhaps to those courses in which
the student had been enrolled. This limited approach would make
it easier to justify disclosures as "necessary" within the meaning of
an exception to the Buckley Amendment,"0 and it would not create
the problems of structural fragmentation feared by O'Neil. Never-
theless, the manner of recordkeeping may preclude this approach,
because it may be easier to provide information with respect to the
entire undergraduate program. If comprehensive disclosure is eas-
ier, the university may again find itself in conflict with the
"necessity" requirement of the Buckley Amendment.
"I For instance, O'Neil argues that there is a strong defense to the enforcement of any
regulation that requires an institution to curtail individual rights. Id. at 538. He gives as an
example a sexist professor. A professor may not discriminate against women in grading or in
course selection without jeopardizing his employer's right to continue to receive federal funds.
However, he may be constitutionally entitled to be a sexist, to make disparaging remarks and
to assign texts which question the competence of women. Id. For a challenge to the argument
that textbook selection in elementary and secondary schools should be left to teachers and
schools, see Hodgson, supra note 114.
21 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3) (1976). Disclosures relative to the complainant's curriculum
and teachers in the history department would logically be easier to justify as necessary than
disclosures relating to, for example, hiring and personnel policies in the medical school.
[Vol. 27
ANTIBIAS LEGISLATION ENFORCEMENT
The statistical information and other records requested in catego-
ries (5) through (8)11 could be "sanitized" to remove identifying
data, such as names, student numbers, and social security numbers.
In smaller schools, however, even sanitized statistical data organ-
ized by race and sex might provide enough information for names
to be ascertained with only minimal detective work. 20 2 Since the
regulations define confidential data to include "other information
which would make the student's identity easily traceable,"2113 it may
be virtually impossible to cleanse the records in category (8) of all
information which could help to identify a specific student. Typi-
cally, a committee considering the dismissal of a student will gather
as much information as possible to determine whether mitigating
factors might excuse the student's poor performance, thereby justi-
fying an academic warning or a probationary period rather than
dismissal. Illness, death in the family, financial problems, or domes-
tic difficulties are factors which might be considered. The student
will probably consider such material highly confidential, and the
letters, memoranda, medical records, and other documents support-
ing the petition are likely to contain information which would make
it easy to determine the identity of the individual even if the name
has been removed from the file.
The dilemma for an educational institution is obvious. Although
the regulations do not expressly place the burden of proof of inno-
cence on the recipient, the effect is essentially the same. When a
complaint is filed, the recipient is given an opportunity to respond
by cooperating with the investigating officials. 204 The investigation
normally requires a review of the recipient's files. The school's ini-
tial defense, therefore, is based upon the information and records
which it makes available to the government. 25 Because most insti-
tutions will want to terminate the investigation quickly, it may be
ZU See notes 120, 191 supra.
22 As an example, assume that there are twenty black matriculants in a class of 500.
Three of these black students experience academic difficulties. Two of the three are excluded
for academic reasons, and one of the two files a complaint with HEW. Very little effort would
be required to identify all of those who experienced academic problems. The detective work
would be made even simpler if the institution were to publish, as many do, class directories
with photographs of the students.
45 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1977).
"' Id. § 80.7.
See id. § 80.7(b)(c). The regulations are vague, but generally the investigation centers
on the practices and files of the university, which places the university in the position of
having to prove its good faith compliance.
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desirable to provide the investigating officials with substantial
amounts of information supporting the university's denial of dis-
crimination. Providing such information, however, may place the
institution between the Scylla of antibias legislation and the Cha-
rybdis of the Buckley Amendment. In the institution's desire to
respond fully and adequately to the discrimination charge, it may
create more problems for itself by disclosing information arguably
covered by the Buckley Amendment, and a violation of the Buckley
Amendment can result in a termination of funds even if the discrim-
ination charge is proven to be false."'8 The limited protection against
loss of funding prior to a determination of the validity of a refusal
to disclose information on grounds of privacy"7 is of some aid and
comfort, but the resolution of that issue may itself involve lengthy
and expensive proceedings.
The crux of the problem-deciding what is necessary for the in-
vestigation of a discrimination charge-is apparently left to govern-
ment agents by the applicable regulations."' What a government
investigator decides is useful for a discrimination inquiry may not,
however, be within the "necessity" exception to the Buckley
Amendment. In the absence of any cases directly on point, some
guidance may be obtained from a review of the legislative history
of the Buckley Amendment, and by analogy to cases dealing with
disclosure-versus-privacy problems under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act29 (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 1974.11
C. Legislative History of the Buckley Amendment
The legislative history of the Buckley Amendment does not di-
rectly address the question of access to information for the purpose
of enforcing antibias legislation;21' however, it does consider the
2" See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1976). A violation of the Buckley Amendment could also
arouse the ire of other students who do not want their privacy invaded.
2 See id. § 1232i(b).
2" See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(c) (1977).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
21 Id. § 552a.
211 The legislative history is sparse. The statute was tacked onto a lengthy Senate educa-
tion bill passed in August 1974. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513(a),
88 Stat. 571. The legislative history of the entire education bill is reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4093. In December 1974 a rider to a bill setting up a White House
Conference on Libraries and Information Services amended the Act to clarify some terms and
to correct inconsistencies. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1858. For
the legislative history of this Amendment, see [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6779.
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problem of maintaining confidentiality in the audit or evaluation of
federally supported educational programs. 21 2 The Conference Com-
mittee that considered the Amendment specifically suggested bal-
ancing the government's need for certain data against the student's
right to privacy.213 The right to privacy which seemed to concern the
conferees, however, was not privacy in the common law or constitu-
tional sense, but rather a very narrow concept of privacy embracing
the right to be free from psychological intrusions which might result
from questions asked or evaluations done during the testing of par-
ticular students.21 1 The language of the statute, however, is not so
constricted. 2 5 The most useful suggestion in the Conference Report
is that a balancing test might be used which would recognize both
the government's need for data and a student's right to privacy. The
government's need and the student's privacy are such nebulous
terms, however, that applications of such a test must be made on
an ad hoc basis.
The December 1974 amendments to the Buckley Amendment 2'
attempted to clarify some terms, but did not effect any substantive
changes. t 7 The House and Senate conferees, however, again made
12 See S. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4206, 4251.
"I The Conference Report stated:
In approving this provision concerning the privacy of information about students,
the conferees are very concerned to assure that requests for information associated
with evaluations of Federal education programs do not invade the privacy of stu-
dents or pose any threat of psychological damage to them. At the same time, the
amendment is not meant to deny the Federal government the information it needs
to carry out the evaluations, as is clear from the sections of the amendment which
give the Comptroller General and the Secretary of HEW access to otherwise private
information about students. The need to protect students' rights must be balanced
against legitimate Federal needs for information. Under the amendment, an educa-
tional agency would have to administer a Federal test or project unless the antici-
pated invasion of privacy or potential harm was determined to be real and signifi-
cant, as corroborated by a generally accepted body of opinion within the psychologi-
cal and mental health professions. In short, the amendment is intended to protect
the legitimate rights of students to be free from unwarranted intrusions; it is not
intended to provide a blanket and automatic justification for a school system's
refusal to administer achievement tests and related instruments necessary to the
evaluation of an applicable program.
Id. (emphasis added).
"I See notes 152-58 supra and accompanying text.
2,5 See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(2), (b)(3), 1232i(a) (1976).
21 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1858.
2,, The single term "education records" was substituted for various other terms, such as
"school records" and "personally identifiable information." See id.
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reference to the general disclosure/confidentiality problem. Their
report said that
nothing in the section should be construed to alter the confi-
dentiality of communications otherwise protected by law. The
conferees, in agreeing to this amendment, did so because State
laws and court decisions vary so widely that the section's po-
tential effects were uncertain. In doing so, the conferees did not
intend to disrupt existing parental and student rights to confi-
dentiality.218
The legislative history at least manifests an intent to respect pre-
viously existing statutory and common law privacy rights. This does
not necessarily solve any problems for an institution, but it does give
an additional basis for resisting federal requests for data.219
D. Analogies from the Interplay of the FOIA and the Privacy Act
The Freedom of Information Act became law in 1966.220 It was
enacted as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act 22'
and was intended to substitute a policy favoring general disclosure
of administrative agency action for what was perceived to be a pre-
vailing policy of nondisclosure.22 The Act establishes disclosure as
the rule and nondisclosure as the exception, although there are nine
categories of information which are specifically exempted from the
disclosure requirements.23 These exceptions do not prevent disclo-
2,, S. REP. No. 1409, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6793, 6794.
2-1 The university may be faced with another problem. A certain document, for instance,
may be necessary to the investigation of a bias complaint, but it may also be privileged under
state law. If it is disclosed, the university may be liable for an invasion of the privacy of the
person to whom the privilege attaches, but if it does not disclose the document the university
may be subjected to governmental pressures. To solve such a dilemma, litigation might be
necessary.
2" Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 652
(1976)).
2' Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-706 (1976)).
See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2419-23. See generally EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
"2 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976). Summarized, the materials exempted from disclo-
sure are:
(1) those classified as secret by Executive Order in the interest of national de-
fense;
(2) those dealing purely with agency personnel and practices;
(3) those specifically exempted by statute;
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sure; they merely provide exemptions from mandatory disclosure. 2A
Nevertheless, agencies have repeatedly relied upon the various ex-
emptions to withhold requested data.215
The FOIA's sixth category of exceptions exempts from mandatory
disclosure "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclo-
sure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. '2 28 Litigation concerning that exemption has re-
sulted in a series of decisions which shed some light on Buckley
Amendment problems. Disputes have focused on the definition of
"similar files" and on what constitutes a "clearly unwarranted"
privacy invasion.
An expansive reading of "similar files" was adopted by the Third
Circuit in Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS.22 The plaintiffs, manufac-
turers of winemaking equipment, wanted a list of all persons within
a certain geographic area who had registered as amateur, noncom-
mercial wine makers with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms. Wine Hobby wanted to use the list for merchandising
purposes, but the court upheld the government's refusal to divulge
the information, stating, "We do not believe that the use of the term
'similar' was intended to narrow the exemption from disclosure and
(4) privileged or confidential trade secrets;
(5) inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda;
(6) private personnel and medical files;
(7) law enforcement investigation files;
(8) reports on financial institutions for or by agencies regulating such institutions;
and
(9) geological information regarding wells.
See id.
"I Professor Kenneth Culp Davis states: "The Act contains no provision forbidding
disclosure. It requires disclosure of all records except what is 'specifically' within the nine
exemptions and other provisions. The exemptions protect against required disclosure, not
against disclosure. The Act leaves officers free to disclose or withhold records covered by the
exemptions." Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761,
766 (1967). This view has received specific judicial approval. See Moore-McCormack Jines,
Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977).
Indeed, some observers have suggested that the FOIA has not really caused any
significant increase in the disclosure of useful and important information. Bureaucratic iner-
tia tends to support a policy of nondisclosure, and the cost of pursuing an FOIA suit is so
high that all but wealthy firms and zealots are discouraged from litigation. See Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DuKE L.J. 416; Note, The Freedom of
Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 CoLUM. L. Ray. 895 (1974).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
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permit the release of files which would otherwise be exempt because
of the resultant invasion of privacy."2'' The court, in effect, read
"similar files" to mean any file containing personal information
which might be private regardless of its relation to employment
history or medical problems.29
In Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of
Agricultureo the FOIA's sixth exemption was held applicable to
information collected from individuals by the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, including facts about marital status, child le-
gitimacy, medical conditions, alcohol consumption, and welfare
benefits.2' The trial court found exemption six inapplicable,'2 2 but
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
reasoning that the exemption "was designed to protect individuals
from public disclosure of intimate details of their lives"' 3 and "from
a wide range of embarrassing disclosures."2 34 This finding, however,
did not forbid disclosure; instead, it required a remand to the dis-
trict court to determine if disclosure would, in this instance, consti-
tute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ' '2 11 Thus,
in both Rural Housing and Wine Hobby the courts indicated a
willingness to treat the sixth exemption as applying generally to
data of a personal nature regardless of the relation to employment
or medical history.
The parameters of the exemption were further clarified by Robles
v. EPA.? The plaintiff in Robles sought disclosure of reports con-
cerning the radioactivity levels in houses in Grand Junction, Colo-
rado, a town which had been built atop a disposal area for radioac-
tive wastes. 237 The government argued that the reports were ex-
empted from disclosure because the data concerning radiation expo-
sures were important only as they related to people and thus were
21 Id. at 135.
See id. Although the decision may have broadened the intended scope of the exemp-
tion, it was clearly justifiable. Submitting requested information to government agencies
should not make one fair game for mail-order solicitations.
498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 511 F.2d 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2' See id. at 76.
See id.
Id. at 77.
I' d.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976)).
2' 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
2" See id. at 844.
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of a private medical nature.23 The court was unimpressed:
[T]he exemption applies only to information which relates to
a specific person or individual, to "intimate details" of a
"highly personal nature" in that individual's employment re-
cord or health history or the like, and has no relevancy to
information that deals with physical things, such as structures
as in this case. 239
Both the Buckley Amendment and FOIA exemption six evidence
a concern for protecting significant areas of privacy. Various institu-
tions in our society, specifically government agencies and recipients
of federal financial assistance, continually amass great quantities of
information about the personal lives of individuals. Much of this
material would normally be kept confidential, but it is disclosed to
an agency or an institution for some particular use.240 Wholesale
dissemination could unreasonably violate individual interests in
privacy. Rather than adopting a laundry list of items which might
overlook some categories that should be included, both the Buckley
Amendment and the FOIA use generic terms and leave actual clas-
sifications to decisions made on an ad hoc basis.24'
The FOIA does not, however, preclude the disclosure of personal
information if there is a sound reason for such disclosure.2 42 An
unsettled question is whether the test for determining the existence
of a sound reason is one of general public interest in the specific data
2 See id. at 845.
2"1 Id. The court's dismissal of the medical files argument might have been too glib.
The information requested was certainly more closely related to health questions than to
"physical things," but the result was justifiable. Some of the data may have related to
individual medical problems, but these were of an unusual nature and were caused by inade-
quate government controls over dangerous substances. See id. at 844. The danger to the
people of Grand Junction was created by a shortcoming of the governmental process, and the
public interest in knowing how and what happened, in order to prevent recurrences, out-
weighs an individual's interest in keeping confidential the fact of possible exposure to radia-
tion.
2'1 Personal income, for instance, is usually considered to be confidential, but it must be
disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service. Students and parents must often provide extensive
information about their personal financial status to schools in order to qualify for scholarship
assistance.
M, There are some limitations. For instance, in the FOIA's sixth category of exemptions
the examples of employment and health records limit the term "similar files" to those which
contain individualized, personal data. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). The exclusion of
"directory information" and the requirement that files contain "personally identifiable"
information similarly limit the term "education records" as used in the Buckley Amendment.
212 See note 225 supra.
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or in the use to which the requesting party intends to put the infor-
mation.113 Differing approaches are illustrated by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' opinion in RobleS211and the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Getman v.
NLRB.2"1 The Robles court adopted a general public interest test,
stating that "disclosure was never to 'depend upon the interest or
lack of interest of the party seeking disclosure.' ",246 In Getman the
government sought to resist a request for disclosure by invoking the
exclusion for trade secrets and competitive information.247 The
plaintiffs wefe two law professors who requested copies of name and
address lists of workers at certain plants where union elections were
about to be held in order to solicit the workers to participate in a
study of the election process.248 In granting the professors' request
the court focused on the intended use of the material rather than
on the public interest in the data or the interest of the individual
workers in being free from telephone or mail solicitations.2 14 Thus,
the court implied that the appropriate test was not the general
public interest in the material, but the purposes for which the re-
questing parties sought the information. The identity of the recipi-
ent and the intended use, rather than the nature of the information
itself, were the keys to disclosure.25
21' See J. Gerberg, Shielding Personal Information from Public Scrutiny (Dec. 16, 1977)
(unpublished paper on file with the author). Mr. Gerberg's paper was submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced course at Emory Law School. He concluded
that this is still an open question which could only be definitively answered by "an amend-
ment to the Act or a Supreme Court decision." Id. at 22.
2" Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973); see text accompanying notes 236-39
supra.
26 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
SIB 484 F.2d at 847 (quoting K. DAvis, AnMINSTRATIvE LAW TREATiSE § 3A.4 at 120 (Supp.
1970)).
2 17 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976); see 450 F.2d at 672.
2,1 See 450 F.2d at 671-72.
211 See id. at 675-76. The information requested was not private, and it could have been
obtained from other sources such as the city directory, the unions, or even the employees.
This decision, however, gave the professors what they wanted at the public's expense.
21 One commentator has suggested that the question should simply be whether the
information is exempt or not, and if it is not exempt, it should be disclosed regardless of the
identity of the recipient. See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemp-
tion and the Privacy Act of 1974, 11 Hlv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rav. 596, 619-20 (1976).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has followed the general approach taken by the
Fourth Circuit in Robles and has focused on the benefit to the public generally rather than
on the benefit to the individual who seeks to obtain the information. See Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502
F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit has reaffirmed its decision in Robles. See Deering
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The Supreme Court offered some guidance in Department of the
Air Force v. Rose"' but did not finally decide the issue. The plain-
tiffs were New York University law students working on an article
about discipline at the military academies, and they requested case
summaries of honor code violations at the Air Force Academy.2
The Air Force resisted the request on the grounds that the files
contained sensitive personal information.23 The Supreme Court
ordered disclosure of the files, but only after information identifying
the individuals involved had been removed.24 Although the Court
did not specifically consider the conflict between Getman and
Robles, it did couch its decision in terms of the general public inter-
est rather than the specific interest of the plaintiffs or the social
value of their intended use of the information.2 5
Rose is of particular interest to university officials because it deals
with an institution of higher education, albeit a highly specialized
one, and because it is concerned with the kinds of files which might
be important in an antibias investigation. The Air Force Academy
is a tax-supported institution in which there is an obvious public
interest. Honor code and ethical violations by potential officers in
the United States Air Force are a matter of legitimate concern to
the taxpaying public. Cadets are on the public payroll and have
legal obligations to the government which make their status funda-
mentally different from that of ordinary university students. On the
other hand, the disciplinary system at the service academies is
unique; matters which might be considered minor indiscretions in
civilian life may result in disciplinary action against cadets. Be-
cause the stigma of such a proceeding may far exceed the serious-
ness of the particular offense, there is a strong argument in favor of
maintaining some degree of confidentiality. This argument is espe-
cially strong when there is an accusation but no adjudication of
Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977). The District of Columbia Circuit has
backed away from Getman to a certain extent but has not unqualifiedly repudiated that
approach. See Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Rural Housing Alliance
the court generally followed Getman, but in dictum in Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), the court admitted that it was uncertain "whether the balancing is to be performed
in the context of unrestricted disclosure to the public or of a use-specified release confined to
the requesting parties." Id. at 171.
1, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
r See id. at 354-55, 355 nn.1 & 2.
2 See id. at 355 n.2, 357.
2' See id. at 358, 380-82.
21 See id. at 372-73, 381.
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guilt. The Supreme Court believed that the public interest in ob-
taining information about the internal affairs of the Air Force Acad-
emy should be balanced against the privacy interests of individual
cadets to determine whether disclosure should be required.' 6 Apply-
ing this balancing test, the Court concluded that both interests
could be served by requiring the disclosure of files only after per-
sonal identifiers had been removed.57 It should be noted, however,
that the removal of personal identifiers might not be enough to
satisfy the Buckley Amendment regulations if the data still make a
student's idefitity easily traceable.25
To the extent that analogies may be drawn between FOIA cases
and Buckley Amendment disputes, it may be argued that the public
interest, measured by the government's need for the data, should be
balanced against the student's privacy interests. Since the govern-
ment investigators seek to carry out a legislative mandate, a public
interest is clearly involved. The necessity may be determined by a
consideration of whether other sources of information are readily
available to the government, whether these sources have been ex-
hausted, and whether they will reasonably suffice for a determina-
tion of the issue. Individual privacy may be protected to a certain
extent by the removal of personal identifiers, and the question
whether the remaining information will make an identity easily
traceable will require a factual, case-by-case analysis.
Significantly different philosophies underlying the two statutes
may cause different "tilts" in the balancing test. Since the FOIA
fosters a general policy of disclosure,2 9 the courts are disposed to
lean toward disclosure.20 The Buckley Amendment, on the other
hand, is founded upon a general policy of nondisclosure."' The tend-
ency in a case based on the FOIA, therefore, should be to require
disclosure, while the tendency in a Buckley Amendment case should
See id. at 372-73.
7 See id. at 358; text accompanying note 254 supra.
See notes 173, 201-03 supra and accompanying text. Some detective work would be
required, but the disclosures ordered by the Court in Rose could provide good leads to some-
one who wanted to learn the names of the individual cadets who were involved.
I" See note 222 supra and accompanying text.
2' See generally NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Renegotiation Bd.
v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d
63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974).
26, See notes 162-64 supra and accompanying text.
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be the opposite. The tendency toward nondisclosure in a Buckley
Amendment case, however, need not be as strong as the tendency
toward disclosure in FOIA actions. This is because those entitled to
receive confidential information about a student under one of the
Buckley exceptions are subject to limitations on further disclosure.
The material does not become open to the public as does FOIA
information. 62
A rather interesting question is whether a private action might lie
to prevent the disclosure by a university of information contained
in education records which a student considers to be confidential.
The Buckley Amendment does not provide for such an action except
by way of complaint to the appropriate government agency, which
might then begin an investigation to determine whether a termina-
tion of funds would be advisable.263 Similarly, the FOIA does not
provide a specific means for a private party to prevent disclosure.
Courts have, however, approved a number of "reverse FOIA" suits
brought to stop the government from releasing sensitive informa-
tion.264 Such suits provide a reasonably effective means for the pro-
tection of confidentiality. The government is required by the statute
to defend FOIA suits, and thereby to represent the interests of indi-
viduals or firms which would prefer to avoid disclosure, but the
government agency will usually not have the same commitment to
the protection of confidentiality as the one who has provided the
data. Similar logic might support actions by students who fear a loss
of protection of the Buckley Amendment. 265
V2 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(3) (1976).
z See 45 C.F.R. §§ 99.63, .64 (1977).
"I See, e.g., Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Parks and Conservation
Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp.
751 (D.D.C. 1977); Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977); Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975); Pharmaceuti-
cal Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1974); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504
(W.D. Ky. 1974); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1974), reconsidere, 402 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1975); Charles River Park "A", Inc.
v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), remanded for reconsideration, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). See generally Comment, Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential
Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 995 (1976).
20 In one case, a district court held that the Buckley Amendment would not support a
private action to compel the release of transcripts. See Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d
1267 (8th Cir. 1977). This was a consolidated appeal from two similar cases. Robert Girardier
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In 1974, Congress enacted the Privacy Act 25 which, although
much more comprehensive, applies many of the same limitations to
federal agencies that the Buckley Amendment applies to federal aid
recipients. 67 The Act generally recognizes privacy as a constitu-
graduated from Webster College in 1972 and Susan Luzkow received her degree from Webster
the following year. Both had financed their undergraduate educations with federally guaran-
teed loans. Each defaulted and filed for personal bankruptcy listing Webster College as an
unsecured creditor, and each was discharged in bankruptcy. After leaving Webster, Ms.
Luzkow made applications to graduate school and Mr. Girardier attended the University of
Missouri at St. Louis where he completed the requirements of that institution for the Master's
degree. Missouri-St. Louis, however, would not issue a degree to Mr. Girardier without his
official transcript from Webster, nor could Ms. Luzkow complete her applications without a
transcript. Webster refused to issue a transcript to either student, citing a provision in the
college bulletin that "[n]o transcript is released until all accounts are paid." Id. at 1269.
Mr. Girardier and Ms. Luzkow brought suit to compel Webster to release their transcripts.
The district court granted Webster's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, Girardier
v. Webster College, 421 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1976), but the court of appeals vacated
that order and remanded with directions to dismiss on the merits. See 563 F.2d at 1277. The
opinion centered on the effect of the discharge in bankruptcy which was found not to prohibit
Webster from refusing to issue a transcript to a defaulting student-debtor. The students also
advanced the theory that the Buckley Amendment provided a basis for a right, not only to
review "education records," but also to compel the release of such records. The court disa-
greed: "The statute does not say that a private remedy is given. Enforcement is solely in the
hands of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under subsection (f). Under such
circumstances, no private cause of action arises by inference." Id. at 1276-77 (footnote omit-
ted).
The result in Girardier does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a suit to prevent
disclosure similar to a reverse-FOIA action. The students in Girardier were not prevented
from seeing their records nor was there an issue of unauthorized disclosure. The real issue
was simply whether such a "self-help" procedure on the part of a private creditor would be
countenanced in the context of a bankruptcy discharge. That issue is altogether different from
the issue in an action alleging, as a basis for jurisdiction, a threat of disclosure of information
covered by the Buckley Amendment and a failure of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to prevent an unauthorized disclosure. If HEW agents are seeking the disclosures,
the conflict of interest between the individual student and the government is particularly
apparent.
I" Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1976)).
217 Congress stated the purpose of the Privacy Act in the following terms:
The purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual
against an invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as
otherwise provided by law, to-
(1) permit an individual to determine what records pertaining to him are
collected, maintained, used, or disseminated by such agencies;
(2) permit an individual to prevent records pertaining to him obtained by
such agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for an-
other purpose without his consent;
(3) permit an individual to gain access to information pertaining to him in
Federal agency records, to have a copy made of all or any portion thereof, and to
correct or amend such records;
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tional right268 and provides a means for an individual to learn what
the government knows about him, to correct mistakes, and to pre-
vent the disclosure of information which he considers to be private,
subject only to a countervailing public interest in disclosure.269
On its face the Privacy Act presents a conflict with the FOIA, at
least with respect to fundamental policies, but the Privacy Act was
meant to be subordinated to the FOIA.270 The interplay between the
statutes arises when information is exempt from mandatory FOIA
disclosure and yet may be disclosed in the agency's discretion. An
agency employee may find himself in a position similar to that of a
university official. He has records which may fall within one of the
exemptions from mandatory disclosure, and if so, the information
probably falls within the ambit of the Privacy Act. If the employee
wrongly discloses the information, he may find himself personally
liable,"' but if he refuses to disclose, someone may try to compel
disclosure through a civil suit against the agency. Since the greater
risk of personal exposure lies in disclosure, the tendency will be to
refuse to disclose. Therefore, even if the Privacy Act is subordinate
to the FOIA, it may effectively undermine the application of the
FOIA. 2
(4) collect, maintain, use or disseminate any record of identifiable personal
information in a manner that assures that such action is for a necessary and lawful
purpose, that the information is current and accurate for its intended use, and that
adequate safeguards are provided to prevent misuse of such information;
(5) permit exemptions from the requirements with respect to records pro-
vided in this Act only in those cases where there is an important public policy need
for such exemption as has been determined by specific statutory authority; and
(6) be subject to civil suit for any damages which occur as a result of willful
or intentional action which violates any individual's rights under this Act.
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a
app., at 317-18 (1976).
See id. § 2(a)(4).
" See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). An individual aggrieved by a wrongful disclosure may
file a civil damages action against the United States. See id. § 552a(g)(1). An employee who
violates the Act may be found guilty of a misdemeanor and fined up to $5,000. See id. §
552a(i).
v' See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(2), (c)(1), (e)(6) (1976).
'7' See id. § 552a(i).
" See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy
Act of 1974, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 596, 627 (1976). The standards decided upon by
various agencies are so different, and it is necessary to wade through such a complex web of
conficting regulations to determine what information may be obtained under what circum-
stances, that two commentators have gone so far as to suggest that yet another federal agency
should be established solely for the purpose of handling FOIA-Privacy Act matters. See
Hanus & Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 555, 591
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There is one peculiarly limiting provision of the Privacy Act. It
applies only to information contained in a "system of records," in
other words, files containing information which may be retrieved by
the use of "personal identifiers" which refer to specific individu-
als.23 An example would be files ordered according to social security
numbers. Material which is simply collected and maintained in
statistical form without reference to individual citizens or firms
apparently is not covered, nor is personal information which is not
maintained as a part of a system of records. There have been no
judicial interpretations of these statutory provisions and it is un-
clear whether the term "system of records" will be given a narrow
or expansive reading. What is interesting, however, is that "system
of records" as used in the Privacy Act is strikingly similar to
"education records" as used in the Buckley Amendment.24 Both
apparently refer to a collection of files maintained in the ordinary
course of business which contain data identifying specific individu-
als to whom the files relate. If the records are not systematized, or
if they are merely collections of anonymous statistical information,
they arguably are covered neither by the Privacy Act nor by the
Buckley Amendment.
Unfortunately, there is little statutory or case law guidance for
university officials who are faced with federal requests for files
which are within the scope of the Buckley Amendment's protection.
There may be analogies to decisions involving the FOIA, but univer-
sity administrators and federal bureaucrats may find themselves in
greater sympathy with one another as they both have to contend
with conflicting statutes and regulations. This shared dilemma,
however, is not likely to lessen the potential for litigation because
in any comprehensive federal investigation of alleged discrimination
the investigators will seek information that falls within the coverage
(1976). This would be a questionable use of taxpayers' money and probably would do nothing
more than create another bureaucratic level of insulation. For more on the Privacy Act, see
Note, The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique, 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 667.
An interesting case illustrating the problem was Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403
F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). A United States Attorney stopped his routine release of
information about arrests and indictments to the press on the grounds that to do so would
violate the Privacy Act. The local press brought an FOIA suit to compel disclosure and won.
There are other federal statutes which also limit disclosure, and an FOIA request may also
raise questions about the scope of these other laws. See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesin-
ger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977).
2' See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (1976).
:' See notes 169-72 supra and accompanying text.
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of the Buckley Amendment. Prudent university officials are un-
likely to want to risk violating one federal statute while attempting
to comply with another. The investigator's job may prove to be as
difficult as that of the individual citizen who seeks disclosure pur-
suant to the FOIA but finds agency employees fearful of violating
the Privacy Act.
Although the FOIA, on the one hand, and the Buckley Amend-
ment and the Privacy Act, on the other, proceed from different
conceptual bases, the three statutes manifest a similar mistrust of
institutional processes. The FOIA is apparently designed to open
the records of federal agencies to the public on the assumption that
the agencies will be more careful of the public trust if their opera-
tions are open to public scrutiny.275 The Privacy Act and the Buck-
ley Amendment reflect a concern with the improper use of the per-
sonal information collected by private and governmental institu-
tions, and they provide mechanisms for the correction of inaccurate
data.276 All three acts, therefore, are intended to assist in the protec-
tion of the individual against large organizations and in the develop-
ment of more open and responsive institutions. Experience with the
Privacy Act or the Buckley Amendment is insufficient to form con-
crete conclusions, but a review of the impact of the FOIA indicates
that it has not been altogether successful in promoting either of
these goals, and the Privacy Act may further diminish the effective-
ness of the FOIA. 27 There should be a basic reconsideration of the
interplay between the Privacy Act and the FOIA and possibly an
amalgamation of them into one statute providing a single set of
standards for disclosure and nondisclosure.
The Buckley Amendment should simply be repealed. It imposes
an unnecessary layer of regulatory control that creates confusion,
requires additional record keeping, and places universities in danger
of losing federal assistance through clerical error or compliance with
"I See notes 222-23 supra and accompanying text.
2' See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2), (3) (1976) (Privacy Act); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (1976)
(Buckley Amendment).
" See generally Hirschhorn, Sunshine for Federal Agencies, 63 A.B.A.J. 55 (1977); Ko-
vach, A Retrospective Look at the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, 27 LABOR L.J.
548 (1976); Markham, Sunshine on the Administrative Process: Wherein Lies the Shade?,
28 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (1976); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year
Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 895 (1974); Comment, Informational Privacy and Public
Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977); Note, The Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974:
An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 951 (1975).
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other regulatory schemes. Common law and constitutional bases are
available for the protection of significant privacy interests of stu-
dents, teachers, administrators, and others engaged in the educa-
tional process. 8 Information provided to federal investigators in
connection with a discrimination investigation or an audit would be
protected from general disclosure by the Privacy Act,27 or perhaps
by one of the exemptions to the FOIA.2°
V. CONCLUSION
The federal government is deeply involved in American higher
education, an involvement unlikely to end in the foreseeable future.
Although the relationship has generally been beneficial to universi-
ties,28 ' the government may at times unnecessarily intrude into
areas which should properly be handled by the university. The pur-
suit of one goal or policy may become so particularized that other
significant values and interests are injured.
The wholesale dissemination of the enormous quantities of infor-
mation routinely collected by major institutions, including universi-
ties, may in some instances constitute an unreasonable invasion of
privacy. Nevertheless, the danger of an invasion of privacy resulting
from the release of information about students by schools, colleges,
and universities is not great enough tor warrant a federal nondisclo-
sure statute, the violation of which could result in a termination of
federal financial assistance. The conflicts that arise between the
enforcement of other federal policies and the Buckley Amendment
further diminish its utility and suggest that the Amendment should
be repealed.
The problem is to ensure that the pursuit of equality of opportun-
ity does not unreasonably intrude into the educational process,
thereby interfering with the creative intellectual inquiry essential to
free expression. Both interests can be served if the concept of aca-
demic freedom is treated as one of several components in a system
of free expression and the university is viewed as the environment
in which that component exists and is nurtured. Intrusions into
the university environment should be minimized, and the burden
See notes 152-58 supra and accompanying text.
' See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
See, e.g., id. § 552a(b)(6).
2' See note 10 supra.
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should be on the government to justify an intrusion. Constant in-
terference with education for the purpose of policing allegedly dis-
criminatory behavior will unnecessarily politicize the university and
lead to an adversarial environment destructive of the rational pur-
suit of learning.

